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1. Introduction 
Stock splits have been a puzzling corporate phenomenon for a long time. As a seemingly 
cosmetic corporate action, stock splits have no real effect on firms’ cash flows and 
fundamentals, yet are frequently associated with positive announcement returns (Fama et al., 
1969; Grinblatt et al., 1984; Lamoureux and Poon, 1987). The positive market reaction to stock 
splits does not seem to be driven by investors’ overreaction or attention-driven price pressure, 
as studies document positive long-run return drifts following split announcements (Ikenberry, 
Rankine and Stice, 1996; Ikenberry and Ramnath, 2002).  
Two leading explanations have been proposed to explain the positive announcement 
returns associated with stock splits. First proposed by Fama et al. (1969) and Grinblatt et al. 
(1984), the “signaling” explanation argues that stock splits could convey managers’ (private) 
favorable information regarding firms’ future performance to outside investors. Evidence 
supporting the signaling explanation is documented by Asquith et al. (1989), Mcnichols and 
Dravid (1990), and Louis and Robinson (2005), who find that splits are associated with better 
future firm fundamentals such as earnings and profitability. However, the exact channel 
through which signaling works is unclear in those studies. Unlike other corporate actions, splits 
are almost costless and firms without favorable information could mimic splitting firms and 
send false signals to the market.1  
The second explanation, the “optimal trading range” hypothesis (Lakonishok and Lev, 
1987; Dyl and Elliott, 2006), also finds mixed evidence in the literature. The idea is that a firm 
with a high share price can improve the liquidity and marketability of its stock by lowering the 
price through splits, as many small retail investors are constrained to purchase low-priced 
stocks only. In an incomplete capital market (Merton, 1987), broadening the shareholder base 
of a stock can effectively reduce the discount rate demanded by investors and increase firm 
value. However, empirical evidence for the “optimal trading range” hypothesis is 
inconclusive.2 Some studies even find that splits increase bid-ask spreads (Copeland, 1979; 
                                                             
1 Exceptions include Brennan and Copeland (1988a) and Ikenberry, Rankine and Stice (1996a; 1996b). Brennan and Copeland 
(1988a) argue that splits are costly because the fixed component of brokerage commissions increases the per-share trading 
costs for low-priced stocks. Ikenberry, Rankine and Stice (1996a; 1996b) argue that stock splits reduce firms’ financial 
flexibility.   
2 Lamoureux and Poon (1987) and Maloney and Mulherin (1992) document that splits increase the number of stockholders 
and the number of trades, but there is little evidence that splits lead to increased trading volume (Lakonishok and Lev (1987), 
Lamoureux and Poon (1987), Conroy et al. (1990)). 
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Conroy et al., 1990) and return volatility (Ohlson and Penman, 1985; Koski, 1995), suggesting 
that splits may have a negative effect on liquidity. Baker and Gallagher (1980) claim that 
managers use splits to increase ownership by individual investors, but Szewczyk and Tsetsekos 
(1995) report that institutional ownership increases after a split.  
In this paper, we propose a behavioral signaling explanation for stock splits, similar in 
spirit to Baker, Mendal, and Wurgler (2015). The key difference between the standard signaling 
and behavioral signaling approaches is that the former relies on destroying real firm value ex 
ante for the signal to be credible, which is roundly rejected by firm managers in the survey of 
Brav et al., 2005. Under the behavioral signaling framework, a signal can be credible without 
destroying real value. As long as there are ex post psychological costs imposed on investors 
when firms engage in false signaling, the signal could be credible.  
In our behavioral signaling framework, investors believe that low-priced stocks have 
higher growth potentials than high-priced stocks. This may be because investors suffer from 
nominal price illusion (Birru and Wang, 2015; 2017), and/or confuse stock splits with cash 
dividends. Due to loss aversion, however, investors will also be particularly disappointed when 
the firms’ realized performance falls short of expectation. Firm managers, with an objective to 
maximize weighted-average of short-run stock prices and long-run firm value, trade off the 
costs and benefits when deciding whether to split shares. A stock split can boost investors’ 
expectation of the firm’s growth potential and short-run stock price, but may also cause 
disproportionally larger price declines if the firm underperforms in the future. In equilibrium, 
only managers with favorable private information about firm fundamentals conduct stock splits, 
and investors correctly infer splits as a signal of positive information. A separating equilibrium 
can be sustained because firms engaging in splits without favorable information have a higher 
likelihood of falling short of investors’ expectation, which will lead to significantly lower stock 
returns in the future. Simply put, investors’ psychological costs due to loss aversion prevent 
low-quality firms from mimicking high-quality firms through stock splits.  
We test our behavioral signaling explanation using a comprehensive sample of stock split 
events in China from 1998 to 2017. Several institutional features of the Chinese stock market 
make it particularly suitable for testing the behavioral signaling explanation. First, unlike the 
U.S. market where institutional investors dominate, the Chinese stock market has a large 
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proportion of retail investors (Carpenter, Lu, and Whitelaw, 2018), who are arguably more 
subject to behavioral biases such as nominal price illusion and loss aversion. Thus, the 
underlying assumptions of our behavioral signaling story are more likely to hold in China. 
Second, brokerage commissions in the Chinese stock market are a fixed percentage of 
transaction value and are independent of the nominal share prices. Third, capital loss is not 
allowed to offset taxable income in China. These two features do not exist in the U.S. market 
and can help rule out alternative explanations for stock splits (detailed below). Last but not the 
least, while the frequency and importance of stock splits is declining in the U.S. stock market 
(Minnick and Raman, 2014), the Chinese market has recently experienced a boom in stock 
splits, which is worth investigating on its own.  
We first document a significantly positive announcement effect for stock splits in the 
Chinese stock market. On average, stock splits are associated with a three-day cumulative 
abnormal return of 1.8%. The three-day window likely underestimates the magnitude of the 
announcement return as there is a price run-up of more than 2% before the announcement.  
As stock splits in China are commonly announced in firms’ profit distribution plans and 
concurrent with their semi-annual or annual reports, we examine whether the announcement 
returns of stock splits are due to confounding events such as earnings or dividends 
announcements. After controlling for the change of earnings and dividends, firm characteristics, 
event date and firm fixed effects, we still find significantly positive announcement returns in 
the range of 2.5% to 4%. This result suggests that stock splits may convey new information 
beyond that contained in earnings and dividends announcements. 
After establishing the robustness of positive announcement returns of stock splits, we test 
several predictions of the behavioral signaling explanation: (1) because of retail investors’ 
nominal price illusion and/or confusion of stock splits with cash dividends, a higher split ratio 
should be associated with a larger announcement return; (2) splitting firms have better future 
operating performance because the psychological costs of disappointing investors prevent 
firms with poor expected performance from conducting stock splits; (3) when the future 
performance is poor, splitting firms experience larger stock price declines than non-splitting 
firms; (4) the positive market reactions associated with stock splits are weaker for firms with 
higher institutional ownership and firms with higher pre-split prices. The empirical evidence is 
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broadly consistent with these predictions. 
Finally, we conduct several tests to rule out alternative explanations for the stock splits 
puzzle. First, the positive announcement returns do not seem to be driven by investor 
overreaction or attention-driven price pressure (Seasholes and Wu 2007; Barber and Odean 
2008). The post-announcement cumulative abnormal returns over different windows are either 
significantly positive or indifferent from zero. Using both a buy-and-hold abnormal return 
(BHAR) approach and the calendar-time portfolio approach, we find a significant return drift 
in the three years following stock splits. In other words, investors appear to underreact to the 
favorable information conveyed by stock splits, which is consistent with the findings based on 
the U.S. sample (Ikenberry and Ramnath, 2002). Second, the signaling model of Brennan and 
Copeland (1988a) argue that stock splits are costly in the U.S. because the fixed cost element 
of brokerage commissions increases the per-share trading costs of low-priced stocks. We can 
easily rule out this explanation using our setting because brokerage commission in China is a 
fixed percentage of transaction value, and independent of stock prices. Third, Lamoureux and 
Poon (1987) propose an explanation based on tax option value. However, stock splits in China 
are unlikely to be associated with tax option as capital loss is not allowed to offset taxable 
income in China. Fourth, the “optimal trading range” hypothesis argues that by restoring price 
to a normal trading range, stock splits can improve liquidity and marketability, thus increasing 
firm value. To rule out this alternative, we control for the change of stock liquidity and investor 
visibility around splits, and find similar announcement effects.  
The contributions of our paper are twofold. First, we provide a new explanation for the 
stock split puzzle, which is different from the traditional signaling explanation and the optimal 
trading range explanation. Our behavioral signaling explanation squares well with the Chinese 
stock split setting. Although it may not be completely generalizable to other markets, it still 
offers a new way of rationalizing this puzzle. 
Second, our paper extends the behavioral signaling framework of Baker and Wurgler (2013) 
and Baker, Mendel and Wurgler (2015) to stock splits, another important corporate event. Baker, 
Mendel and Wurgler (2015) propose a behavioral signaling theory to explain the dividend 
stickiness puzzle. However, unlike stock splits, cash payout is a costly corporate action and 
thus harder to differentiate with traditional signaling theories. In addition, the Chinese stock 
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market offers a better laboratory than the U.S. market to test behavioral signaling theories as 
less sophisticated investors dominate the Chinese market. Our findings that the stock splits 
puzzle can be well explained by the behavioral signaling model show the promise of applying 
the same framework to other settings.  
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the institutional background 
of stock splits in China. Section 3 presents the basic facts of stock splits in China. Section 4 
tests whether existing theories can explain the stock split puzzle in China. Section 5 outlines a 
simple behavioral signaling explanation for stock splits and tests the empirical predictions. 
Section 6 rules out several alternative explanations and conduct robustness checks. Section 7 
concludes.  
 
2. Institutional Background 
2.1 Stock Splits in China 
In China, except for very few special cases, the par value of all tradable stocks is 1 RMB 
per share, and it is a convention that a firm keeps the par value unchanged after being publicly 
listed. Therefore, unlike in the U.S., listed firms in China do not split shares directly; instead, 
they employ two indirect methods. The first is to pay stock dividends out of retained earnings, 
and the second is to issue new shares out of capital surplus. Under both methods, the outcome 
is the same as a direct stock split, with an increased number of shares outstanding and reduced 
nominal share prices. The implementation costs of both methods are trivial. For each newly 
issued share, typically 1 RMB would be deducted from retained earnings or capital surplus as 
the par value of most stocks in China is 1 RMB per share. The main difference between the 
direct and indirect splits is the accounting treatment. For direct stock splits, no accounting 
treatment is needed. For indirect stock splits, either retained earnings or capital surplus is 
deducted to increase the capital stock. However, just like direct stock splits, neither stock 
dividends nor converting capital surplus into new shares has any real effects on the firm’s 
fundamentals, because the accounting treatment of indirect splits only involves adjustments 
among several sub-categories of the shareholders’ account. 
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2.2 Investors’ Misperceptions about Stock Splits  
Unlike major developed markets, the Chinese stock market is dominated by retail investors 
without sufficient finance and accounting knowledge. As of the end of 2016, retail investors 
owned more than 99% of all brokerage accounts and conducted more than 85.65% of trading 
in terms of transaction value (Shanghai Stock Exchange Statistical Annual, 2017). These retail 
investors have various misperceptions about stock splits. 
First, retail investors are likely to treat low-priced stocks as lotteries (Kumar, 2009) 
because they tend to overestimate the upside potential of such stocks (Birru and Wang, 2016).  
Second, retail investors often view stock splits as a form of profit distribution similar to 
cash dividends, although nothing is actually paid out of the firm with stock splits. For example, 
according to Baidu Baike, China’s version of Wikipedia, stock splits are described as a form 
of corporate payouts. Popular financial websites, such as Sina Finance and Hexun.com,3 often 
categorize both stock splits and cash dividends as payouts and present them side by side.  
The timing a company announces stock split may further exacerbate this misperception. 
In practice, both cash dividends and stock splits are disclosed in the annual or semi-annual 
profit distribution proposals, which gives investors the impression that stock splits and cash 
dividends are equivalent means of distributing profits. The terminology a firm uses to describe 
the stock split is sometimes misleading. For example, on April 1, 2015, Meters Bonwe, a 
Chinese listed company, declared that for every 10 outstanding shares, an investor would get 
five new bonus shares (stock dividends from retained earnings), cash dividends of one RMB, 
nine new shares from capital surplus and another one new share from surplus reserve (stock 
dividends from retained earnings too). This kind of statement conveys illusive information to 
Meters Bonwe’s shareholders that their stock investments earned lucrative profits, although 
only 0.1 RMB per share was the actual profit distributed to them. We provide detailed 
information about Meters Bonwe’s 2014 annual profit distribution in Appendix B. 
Although investors’ bias associated with stock splits may stem from a variety of reasons, 
a clear prediction is that all of them lead to more optimistic expectation about firms’ future 
performance after stock splits.  
 
                                                             
3 Both Sina Finance and Hexun.ccom are leading financial portal websites in China. 
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3. Empirical Facts of Stock Splits  
We use a comprehensive sample of stock split events in China’s A-share market from 1998 
to 2017 to conduct empirical analysis. Chinese firms announce stock splits in profit distribution 
proposals, and in most cases profit distribution proposal is a section of financial report. Table 
1 presents a summary of the stock splits events year by year from 1998 to 2017. Except for 
2003, there are more than 150 A-share listed firms conducting share splits each year, and such 
firms on average, account for 10% to 30% of the total number of listed companies. Table 1 also 
shows that most of the stock splits are announced in the annual profit distribution proposals. 
The majority of stock splits are bundled together with the release of annual or semi-annual 
reports as firms are required to disclose their profit distribution plans in these reports. The 
major source of new shares comes from capital surplus, especially in recent years, and the split 
ratio is gradually rising over time.  
Annual and semi-annual profit distribution proposals differ in importance and formality, 
and there are much more stock splits announcements in annual proposals.4 To be consistent, 
we only consider annual profit distribution proposals for our analysis in this section. Our initial 
sample includes all annual profit distribution proposals from all publicly listed companies in 
the Shanghai Stock Exchange and Shenzhen Stock Exchange. We then exclude firms listed for 
less than 6 months and firms in the financial industry. To avoid the confounding effects of other 
corporate events, we further exclude observations when stock trading is suspended in any day 
during the [-1, 1] event window. 5  We also exclude observations with missing values in 
regression variables. Except for stock returns and the split ratio, we winsorize all continuous 
variables at their 1st and 99th percentiles to mitigate the influence of outliers. All financial data 
are retrieved from the CSMAR and Wind databases. 
Panel A of Table 2 presents the summary statistics of the main variables used in our 
regression analyses. CAR[-10, -2], CAR[-1, 1], CAR[-10, 1], and CAR[2, 10] are cumulative 
abnormal returns over the event window in brackets, where the abnormal return is the raw 
return adjusted by size and book-to-market ratio. Split Dummy equals 1 if a firm conducts stock 
                                                             
4 In our sample period, there are 34,451 annual profit distribution proposals with 20,836 proposals announcing cash dividends 
and 6,086 proposals announcing splits. Meanwhile, there are 32,236 semi-annual proposals in total, but only 744 and 856 
proposals announce cash dividends and stock splits, respectively. 
5 Chinese firms often suspend stock trading if they encounter major corporate events. Our results are unchanged if this 
restriction is relaxed. 
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splits and 0 otherwise. Split Ratio is the ratio of newly issued shares from stock splits as a 
fraction of the initial number of shares outstanding. ΔDividends is the difference of current 
fiscal year cash dividends and the prior fiscal year cash dividends scaled by the prior fiscal year 
end total market capitalization. ΔEarnings is the difference of the current 4th quarter earnings 
and the 4th quarter earrings in the preceding fiscal year scaled by the preceding fiscal year end 
total market capitalization.6 Annual Report is a dummy variable that equals one if the profit 
distribution proposal is disclosed with the annual report. LnSize is the natural logarithm of 
market capitalization of the firm’s tradable shares. LnBM is the natural logarithm of book-to-
market ratio. Ret[-12, -2] is the cumulative stock returns over the past 11 months, skipping the 
most recent month. The above control variables LnSize, LnBM and Ret[-12, -2] are all lagged 
by one month if the profit distribution proposal is announced during the second half of the 
month, and will be lagged for an additional month if the proposal is announced in the first half 
of the month. Detailed variable definitions are given in Appendix A. 
Panel B divides the full sample into the share splitting group and non-splitting group. It 
shows that share splitting firms tend to have lower book-to-market ratios, and experience a 
larger increase in stock price, earnings, and cash dividends. The comparison implies that it is 
important to account for the differences between splitting and non-splitting firms.   
Figure 1 shows the cumulative abnormal returns of stock splits events starting from 20 
trading days before the announcement date. Similar to the pattern in the U.S. (Grinblatt, 
Masulis and Titman, 1984; Lamoureux and Poon, 1987; Mcnichols and Dravid, 1990; 
Ikenberry, Rankine and Sitce, 1996; Rankine and Stice; 1997a; 1997b), stock splits in China is 
on average associated with significantly positive market reactions. As shown in this figure, the 
stock price begins to rise several days before the announcement day and has a significant price 
jump at the announcement day. Figure 2 illustrates that there is no return reversal after split 
announcements. Instead, there is an upward post-event return drift.  
Table 3 reports the short-term market reactions to split announcements by various adjusting 
methods. In the first three columns, we report daily abnormal returns from one day before the 
announcements to one day after the announcements. On average, stock splits lead to 0.7%, 0.9% 
                                                             
6 Chinese A-Share listed firms were required to disclose quarterly financial report after 2002. Therefore, before 2003, we 
define ΔEarnings as half of the difference of current 2nd half-year-earnings and the 2nd half-year-earrings in the preceding year 
divided by the past fiscal year end total equity capitalization  
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and 0.1%~0.2% of abnormal returns on date -1, 0 and 1, respectively. The market reactions to 
stock splits are robust and comparable under different expected return models. Summing up 
the abnormal returns over the [-1, 1] event window, stock splits are associated with close to 
1.8% cumulative abnormal returns. Consistent with Figure 1, stock price starts to rise before 
the announcement day, as both the [-10, -2] window and the [-5, -2] window are associated 
with significant positive cumulative abnormal returns. This indicates the possibility of 
information leakage about stock splits ahead of the formal announcement. The findings are 
generally consistent with Titman, Wei and Zhao (2017).  
The last two columns of Table 3 report the post-event cumulative abnormal returns. In 
some specifications, we find significant positive CARs; in other cases, abnormal stock returns 
are indistinguishable from zero. These findings are consistent with the post-announcement 
pattern we have observed in Figure 1. 
 Both stock splits and cash dividends in China are disclosed in the profit distribution 
proposal, and in most cases concurrent with firms’ annual or semi-annual reports. To rule out 
the possibility that the short-term price impact of stock splits is driven by cash dividends or 
earnings announcements, we regress cumulative abnormal returns on the stock split dummy 
(Split Dummy) and control for potential confounding factors. 
The results are reported in Table 4. For brevity, we only use the CARs (size and book-to-
market adjusted) in the pre-event window [-10, -2], event window [-1, 1] and post-event 
window [2, 10] in the regression analysis. In columns (1) to (3), we conduct regressions with 
event date and firm fixed effects but without other controls. The results are generally consistent 
with the univariate analysis in Table 3. The stock price starts to rise before the stock splits 
announcement, and does not reverse in the subsequent trading days. The price impact of stock 
splits during the event window [-1, 1] is about 2.4% (t-statistic=23.28).  
In columns (4) to (6), we add dividend growth (ΔDividends) and the 4th quarter earnings 
growth (ΔEarnings) to better isolate stock splits effects from confounding factors such as 
dividend growth and earnings growth.7 To take account of the possible difference between 
financial-report-bundled and unbundled profit distribution proposals, we also add into the 
regression a dummy variable, Annual Report, which equals 1 when the stock split is disclosed 
                                                             
7 Both dividends and earnings changes are deflated by total market capitalization at the previous fiscal year end. 
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in the annual report and 0 otherwise.8 The corresponding results are qualitatively similar. 
In columns (7) to (9) of Table 4, we further control for a set of variables, including LnSize, 
LnBM and Ret[-12, -2], which are associated with cross-sectional stock returns and may be 
correlated with stock splits decisions. When the dependent variable is CAR[-1, 1] or CAR[2, 
10], we also include CAR[-10, -2] as another control variable to account for possible 
information leakage. After adding the aforementioned control variables, the economic 
magnitude and statistical significance of Split Dummy are generally unaffected.  
 
4. Existing Explanations for the Positive Market Reactions to Stock Splits  
The findings in Section 3 show that stock splits in China are on average associated with 
positive announcement returns. Prior literature has proposed several explanations for the 
positive market reactions to stock splits. This section briefly reviews the leading explanations 
and discusses their limitations in our setting.  
4.1 Traditional Signaling Theories 
   Fama, Fisher, Jensen and Roll (1969) argue that firms employ stock splits to communicate 
the information of future increase in dividends. However, Grinblatt, Masulis, and Titman (1984) 
find that the announcement returns of stock splits cannot be explained by imminent increase in 
dividends, and they provide evidence supporting the signaling role of stock splits. Lakonishok 
and Lev (1987), Asquith et al. (1989), Mcnichols and Dravid (1990), and Louis and Robinson 
(2005) find that splits are associated with better firm fundamentals such as earnings and 
profitability in the future. However, as the implementation cost of stock splits is trivial, standard 
signaling models often have a difficult time to explain what makes stock splits a credible signal. 
One potential explanation is based on transaction costs. Brennan and Copeland (1988a) 
argue that the commission rate of per dollar transaction is inversely related to nominal share 
price, which makes splits a credible signal. Brennan and Hughes (1991) develop a model in 
which the dependence of brokerage commission on share price provides incentives for financial 
analysts to supply information. Chemmanur, Hu and Huang (2015) document evidence 
supporting the information production theory. However, the transaction cost argument is 
                                                             
8 When Annual Report takes value of 1, ΔEarnings is defined as the earnings growth rate; when Annual Report takes value of 
0, ΔEarnings is set as 0. Our results are qualitatively unchanged if ΔEarnings is not dependent on Annual Report 
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unlikely to explain stock splits in China, since brokerage commissions are usually a fixed 
percentage of the transaction value and are independent of the nominal share price.  
Rankine and Stice (1997a; 1997b) propose a financial flexibility hypothesis for stock 
splits. They notice that the accounting treatment of stock splits in the U.S. reduces a firm’s 
financial flexibility, since debt covenants often impose restrictions on firms’ ability to pay cash 
dividends out of retained earnings. Consistent with this hypothesis, Rankine and Stice (1997a; 
1997b) find that stock splits are associated with larger market reactions when the accounting 
rules governing stock splits are more stringent. However, the financial flexibility hypothesis is 
unlikely to hold in China for the following reasons. First, in China the new shares generated 
by stock splits mainly come from capital surplus, not from retained earnings, as shown in Table 
1. Since year 2000, capital surplus contributes to more than 70% of the new shares. The 
accounting rule for transferring capital surplus is more lenient than it is for retained earnings.9 
Second, unlike retained earnings, capital surplus cannot be used to pay cash dividends in China, 
so firms’ financial flexibility should not be hampered by stock splits.  
4.2 The Optimal Trading Range Hypothesis 
The optimal trading range hypothesis states that a firm with a high nominal share price 
can improve the liquidity and marketability of its stock by lowering the share price through 
stock splits. This is because small retail investors often have limited investment capital, and 
they are unable to hold high-priced stocks in their portfolios.  
Merton (1987) points out that in an incomplete capital market, broadening the shareholder 
base of a stock could effectively reduce the discount rate demanded by investors and increase 
firm value. Using a unique setting in Japan, Amihud, Mendelson and Uno (1999) find that 
when a stock become more available to investors, the firm value increases with a broadening 
investor base. Muscarella and Vetsuypens (1996) identify the liquidity improvement effect of 
stock splits using a sample of ADR splits. Lin et al. (2009) find trading continuity improves 
following stock splits, and the reduction in liquidity risk explains the positive announcement 
returns of stock splits.  
However, there is also empirical evidence against this hypothesis. For example, several 
                                                             
9 Firms usually have abundant capital surplus because the IPO offering prices are usually much higher than the par value of a 
stock. For example, if the IPO price of a firm is 21 RMB, then the newly issued shares in the IPO process make it possible to 
issue a 20 for 1 split. 
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studies find that stock splits impede liquidity because brokerage commissions and bid-ask 
spread increase after stock splits (Copeland, 1979; Brennan and Copeland, 1988a; Conroy, 
Harris and Benet, 1990), which make trading costlier.  
4.3 Tax Option Value Explanation 
Stock returns tend to become more volatile after share splitting (Ohlson and Penman, 1985; 
Lamoureux and Poon, 1987; Brennan and Copeland, 1988b; Sheikh, 1989; Dubofsky, 1991; 
Koski, 1998; Shue and Townsend, 2018). Constantinides (1984) proposes a theory of optimal 
trading rules under personal taxes and points out that volatile stock prices are more appealing 
as such stocks have larger tax option value. Based on the above empirical patterns and the 
theory of Constantinides (1984), Lamoureux and Poon (1987) rationalize the stock splits puzzle 
by treating stock splits as a tool to manage volatility and tax option value. Therefore, according 
to this theory, the positive announcement returns of stock splits come from the anticipated 
increase in tax option value.10 However, the tax option value explanation is not applicable in 
China, as capital losses in stock trading are not allowed to deduct income taxes in China.  
 
5. A Behavioral Signaling Explanation for Stock Splits 
5.1 A Behavioral Signaling Explanation 
Motivated by Baker and Wurgler (2013) and Baker, Mendel and Wurgler (2015), we 
propose a behavioral signaling explanation for the positive market reactions to stock splits. In 
Appendix C, we build a simple model to illustrate the key idea and empirical predictions of 
behavioral signaling.  
The behavioral signaling explanation has two key elements. Firstly, investors, especially 
retail investors, have misperceptions (introduced in section 2.2) about stock splits. In this paper, 
we do not attempt to identify the exact sources of investors’ biases associated with stock splits. 
In fact, investors’ misperceptions about stock splits can result from many reasons, and they 
                                                             
10 In U.S., the personal tax rate on long term capital gains and capital losses is about half the short term tax rate, Constantinides 
(1984) gives an example about the tax timing option. “Suppose an investor bought a stock one year ago, if the stock price 
declined, he optimally sells the stock and repurchase it to realize the short term capital loss immediately, if the stock price has 
increased instead, the investor optimally defers the realization of a short term capital gain and one day later faces two 
alternatives. First, he may defer the realization of the long term gain. Second, he may sell the stock and repurchase it, realizing 
a long term gain and reestablishing the favorable short term status, in order to realize future capital losses at the short term 
rate”. 
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need not to be mutually exclusive. For example, if investors believe low-priced stocks have 
more upside potentials (Birru and Wang, 2016), they would have higher price appreciation 
expectation after stock splits. If investors view stock splits and cash dividends as equivalent 
means of payouts, share splits are naturally associated with better fundamentals in investors’ 
mind. The consequences of these misperceptions is that investors’ expectation about firms’ 
future performance should increase upon split announcements. 
The second element of our behavioral signaling explanation is the psychological costs to 
prevent low-quality firms from mimicking high-quality firms through stock splits. We assume 
that investors’ preference is reference-dependent so that if splitting firms’ realized operating 
performance fall short of investors’ high expectation, investors will be very disappointed.  
With these two elements in place, as we show in Appendix C, a separating equilibrium 
can be sustained. Firm managers, with an objective to trade off the benefits of boosted short-
term stock prices and the potential costs of disappointing investors later, will decide an optimal 
stock split ratio to convey private information to the market.  
An important distinction between the behavioral signaling and traditional signaling 
models is that the former does not rely on destroying real firm value ex ante to make the signal 
credible (Baker, Mendal, and Wurgler, 2015). This feature makes the behavioral signaling 
explanation more applicable for stock splits, which do not affect firm cash flow and are almost 
costless to implement. In contrast, the traditional signaling framework has difficulties in 
explaining why a seemingly cosmetic corporate action with minimum costs could credibly 
convey information to investors.     
5.2 Empirical Tests of the Behavioral Signaling Explanation 
This section tests several key predictions of the behavioral signaling explanations.  
5.2.1 Split Ratio and the Announcement Returns of Stock Splits 
If the stock splits are used by managers to convey private information, we should observe 
larger market reactions to those splits with higher split ratios in equilibrium. We test this 
prediction by regressing the short-run announcement returns of stock splits on split ratios. We 
include both splitting and non-splitting firms in the regression and use the same set of controls 
variables as in Table 4. 
Table 5 reports the regression results of cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) on split 
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ratios. Column (1) shows that the variable Split Ratio is positively associated with the three-
day CAR with a t-statistic as large as 21.60. As we have learned from Figure 1 and Table 3, 
stock prices rise significantly several days before stock splits announcements. To account for 
the potential information leakage, we use CAR[-10, 1] to measure the stock splits 
announcement effects in column (2). The corresponding result shows that the effect is even 
larger after taking into account the information leakage. Economically, the coefficient of Split 
Ratio is 0.069 when the dependent variable is the CAR over the [-10, 1] window, indicating 
that a two-for-one split (Split Ratio equals 1) on average leads to a CAR of 6.9%. This finding 
is consistent with the equilibrium prediction of our behavioral signaling explanation, as firms 
with differential degrees of private information choose different split ratios to separate from 
each other. 
To isolate the effect of share splitting from concurrent dividend and earnings growth 
information, columns (3) and (4) include ΔDividends, ΔEarnings and Annual Report as control 
variables in the the regressions of CARs on split ratios. We find that the coefficient of Split 
Ratio remains significantly positive and its economic magnitude is qualitatively unchanged. 
This result implies that the positive relationship between split ratios and announcement returns 
is not driven by dividend or earnings growth. In the last two columns of Table 5, we add all the 
control variables used in Table 4 and the results are similar.   
The coefficients of most control variables are in line with prior studies. For example, 
ΔDividends and ΔEarnings are positively related to the announcement returns in columns (3) 
to (6), indicating that both dividends change and earnings change have information contents. 
The significant coefficients of LnSize and LnBM are consistent with the well-known size effects 
and value effects in the Chinese stock market. The coefficient of CAR[-10, -2] is significantly 
negative, suggesting that investors are less thrilled by stock splits announcements when there 
is more information leakage. 
We also employ alternative model specifications to examine the robustness of the above 
findings and obtain consistent results (presented in Table D1 of Appendix D).  
5.2.2 The Fundamentals of Firms Conducting Stock Splits 
Our behavioral signaling explanation predicts that in equilibrium, only firms with 
favorable fundamentals would split shares. This implies that splitting firms should have better 
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operating performance than non-splitting firms in the post-split periods. To test this prediction, 
we compare the operating performance of splitting firms with non-splitting firms in the same 
industry following stock splits. 11  Specifically, we regress various measures of operating 
performance including the return on assets (ROA), earnings growth and sales growth on stock 
splits variables (Split Dummy or Split Ratio), and control for firm fixed effects, industry × year 
fixed effects, and several firm characteristics including size, book-to-market ratio, past 
profitability, dividend change, and earnings change. The results are reported in Table 6. 
Panel A examines the return on assets in the year of, one year after, and two years after 
stock splits. In all regressions, the variable for stock splits (Split Dummy or Split Ratio) is 
significantly positive, indicating that splitting firms are more profitable than their non-splitting 
counterparts in the years following the splits. Panel B and Panel C examine earnings growth 
and sales growth and show that splitting firms experience faster earnings and sales growth after 
the splits. These findings are consistent with Asquish, Healy and Palepu (1989), who find that 
stock split conveys information about the growth of firm fundamentals in the future. 
Importantly, we control for past profitability in the regressions so the result is not driven by 
splitting firms being persistently more profitable.  
Overall, the findings suggest that firms conducting stock splits have better operating 
performance than non-splitting firms in the same industry do, both concurrently and several 
years into the future. The results hold for both stock splits variables, Split Dummy and Split 
Ratio, which is consistent with signaling motives that managers with more favorable private 
information choose larger split ratios to differentiate with others.  
5.2.3 Stock Splits and Investor Optimism 
 An important assumption underlying the behavioral signaling explanation is that 
unsophisticated retail investors naively view stock splits as good news and become more 
optimistic about splitting firms’ future performance. The difficulty in testing this assumption is 
that investors’ beliefs are usually unobservable. In this section, we use several indirect 
measures for investors’ beliefs to test this assumption.  
5.2.3.1 Stock Splits and Retail Investors’ Trading Behavior 
                                                             
11 For example, if a firm announced stock split in its 2013 annual profit distribution proposal, year 2013 is coded as year 0, 
and 2014 and 2015 coded as year +1 and +2, respectively.  
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Retail investors would buy splitting stocks if they view stock splits as good news, and this 
would lead to an increase in the number of shareholders. This prediction is testable as the China 
Securities Regulatory Commission requires every listed firm to report its number of 
shareholders at the last trading day of each quarter. 
Specifically, we examine whether a firm’s shareholder base widens when it announces 
stock splits by regressing the change of the number of shareholders around the profit 
distribution announcement on Split Dummy or Split Ratio. We remove observations if a firm’s 
profit distribution announcement date and its corresponding ex-day are in the same quarter, so 
that the impact of stock splits on the number of shareholders is unlikely due to stocks becoming 
more accessible after the ex-day. 12  Besides the control variables used in the previous 
regressions, we also control for several attention-grabbing indicators (Seasholes and Wu 2007; 
Barber and Odean 2008). These are absolute quarterly returns, Max(0, Quarterly Return) and 
Max(0, -Quarterly Return), the number of trading days that a stock reaches its daily 10% price 
limit, 10% Price Limit and -10% Price Limit, and the abnormal trading volume relative to prior 
four quarters, Abnormal Volume.  
As shown in Table 7, the regression coefficients of Split Dummy in columns (1) to (3) are 
all significantly positive. These findings suggest that retail investors become more optimistic 
after stock splits, which leads to a net increase in the number of shareholders of the splitting 
firm. Similarly, the coefficients of Split Ratio are all positive and significant in columns (4) to 
(6), indicating that retail investors view stock splits with larger split ratios more favorably.  
Our results in this section are consistent with Titman, Wei and Zhao (2017), who use 
transaction-level data and find that small investors are net buyers after split announcements.  
5.2.3.2 Stock Splits and Retail Investors’ Sentiment 
If retail investors become more optimistic after stock splits, they are likely to post positive 
comments on online discussion forums. To that end, we use the data from the CNRDS database 
that covers two popular investor discussion forums in China, Sina Guba and East Fortune 
Guba.13 The data provider classifies retail investors’ posts into three categories, positive, 
neutral, and negative based on machine learning algorithm, and summarizes the number of 
                                                             
12 We can do this because on average there are 75 days between the profit distribution announcement date and the ex-day. 
13 Sina Guba and East Fortune Guba have investor discussion forum for each listed stocks in the Chinese A-share stock market. 
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posts in each category for each stock at daily frequency.  
We define Retail Investor Sentiment [t1, t2] as the number of positive posts minus the 
number of negative posts over the sum of positive and negative posts from day t1 to day t2, and 
regress Retail Investor Sentiment [t1, t2] on stock splits variables. If retail investors view stock 
splits as good news, both Split Dummy and Split Ratio should be significantly positive.  
We report the results based on the [0, 1] and [0, 10] window in Table 8.14 In Panel A of 
Table 8, Split Dummy is significantly and positively associated with retail investor sentiment 
on the discussion forums, and this positive relation holds after we control for firm 
characteristics and firm and event date fixed effects. In Panel B of Table 8, we find that retail 
investors’ sentiment on the discussion forums become more positive when firms announce 
larger stock splits. This finding provides supporting evidence that retail investors become more 
optimistic about firms’ future performance after stock splits. 
5.2.3.3 Analysts Forecast Revision around Stock Splits 
We also examine whether stock splits could raise investors’ expectation by looking at 
analyst forecast revisions around stock splits. To be clear, our behavior signaling explanation 
does not rely on professional investors such as financial analysts having misconceptions about 
stock splits as unsophisticated investors do. However, under separating equilibrium, stock splits 
do covey managers’ private information, so sophisticated investors should also raise their 
expectations for splitting firms’ future fundamentals.  
To test this prediction, we use the revision of analysts’ consensus forecasts (Forecast 
Revision) of earnings for fiscal year t+1 around the split announcement day to infer investors’ 
belief updating. The results are reported in Table 9. Consistent with our behavioral signaling 
explanation, stock splits indeed raise analysts’ expectations about firms’ future earnings. 
Columns (1) to (3) shows that Split Dummy is positively related to analysts’ forecast revisions 
of earnings, and this finding is robust when we use Split Ratio in Columns (4) to (6).  
5.2.4 Long-term Stock Performance When Splitting Firms Fall Short of Expectation 
Another key assumption underlying our behavioral signaling explanation is that investors 
have reference-dependent preference and will be particularly disappointed when splitting firms’ 
                                                             
14 We find similar results if we use windows identical to the 2 event return windows, or we use alternative windows such as 
the single event date 0, [0,5] and [-5, 5]. 
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future performance falls short of their expectation. To test this assumption, we examine whether 
the long-run stock returns of splitting firms are lower when they have subpar performance 
below investors’ expectation after the splits.  
We first select all listed firms with analyst coverage and compute the difference between 
realized earnings and analysts’ median earnings forecast for the following fiscal year. Then in 
each year, we sort stocks into quartiles based on the difference between realized earnings and 
analysts’ median forecasts, and define a dummy variable Underperform that equals one if the 
firm falls into the lowest quartile. We then regress the 12-month buy-and-hold abnormal returns 
(size and book-to-market ratio adjusted),15 BHAR[1, 12], on Split Dummy (or Split Ratio), 
Underperform, and Split Dummy × Underperform (or Split Ratio × Underperform).   
The first three columns in Panels A of Table 10 show that the interaction term Split Dummy 
× Underperform are always significantly negative under different regression specifications. 
The coefficient on Underperform itself is significantly negative, suggesting firms with poor 
earnings performance have worse stock performance. The negative coefficient of Split Dummy 
× Underperform indicates that splitting firms experience even lower long run returns when 
they have poor performance post splits, compared with similarly underperforming firms 
without undergoing stock splits. In columns (4) to (6) of Panel A of Table 10, we combine 
event-month returns and post-event returns and use BHAR[0, 12] as the dependent variable. 
The corresponding results show that Split Dummy × Underperform is also significantly 
negative, which means that the positive announcement returns following stock splits would be 
offset by the lower long-run returns when the performance of splitting firms falls short of 
investors’ expectation. In the Panel B of Table 10, we replace Split Dummy by Split Ratio and 
find similar results.  
The findings of Table 10 serve as the key mechanism preventing low-quality firms from 
mimicking high-quality firms by using stock splits in our behavioral signaling framework.  
5.2.5 Cross-sectional Heterogeneity 
In this section, we test several cross-sectional predictions of our behavioral signaling 
explanation.  
                                                             
15 We also use market portfolio and industry portfolios as return benchmark, and obtain similar results.  
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5.2.5.1 Institutional Holdings 
If stock splits convey credible information to investors, then in equilibrium, the 
announcement effects of stock splits should be more pronounced when investors are more 
optimistic about stock splits. The reason is that when investors are very optimistic about stock 
splits, only firms with very good fundamentals can manage to not disappoint investors ex-post 
and conduct large ratio stock splits. For this reason, we predict that the market reaction to stock 
splits should be greater if more retail investors hold the firm, as optimism associated with stock 
splits should be more prevalent among retail investors.  
We use the fraction of shares held by institutional investors (Institutional Holdings) to 
proxy for investor composition and regress the split announcement returns CAR[-1, +1] or 
CAR[-10, +1] on the interaction of Institutional Holdings with Split Ratio. The above prediction 
implies that the coefficient of the interaction term is negative. The regression results are 
reported in Table 11. Consistent with the prediction, the coefficients of the interaction term of 
Split Ratio with Institutional Holdings are significantly negative in all regressions.  
5.2.5.2 Pre-split Stock Price 
Investors suffering from nominal price illusion believe that low-priced stocks have higher 
growth potential than high-priced stocks (Birru and Wang, 2016). Under the behavioral 
signaling explanation, this implies that the positive market reactions to stock splits should be 
stronger for firms with lower pre-split stock prices.  
To test this prediction, we add the natural logarithm of the pre-split share price LnPrice 
(measured as the closing price in the previous month if profit distributions are announced in 
the second half of a month, and lagged for an additional month if profit distribution 
announcements happen in the first half of the month) into the regression, and interact this 
variable with Split Ratio. Consistent with our prediction, Table 12 shows that the interaction 
terms are significantly negative in all specifications.  
This result also helps rule out the “optimal trading range” hypothesis (Baker and Gallagher, 
1980; Baker and Powell, 1993). According to this explanation, stock splits can restore high-
priced stocks to a normal trading range, and hence improve its marketability to small investors. 
If our findings are mainly driven by the (perceived) improvement in post-split marketability, 
the market reactions to stock splits should be more positive for stocks with higher pre-split 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3541201
 20 
share prices, as such stocks would benefit more from the improvement in marketability by 
splitting to a lower trading range. Our evidence is contradictory to this prediction of the 
“optimal trading range” hypothesis.  
 
6. Ruling out Alternative Explanations 
6.1 Attention-Driven Price Pressure 
Under our behavioral signaling explanation, stock splits are credible signals of firms’ 
future performance and prices rise after stock splits to reflect the market’s updated expectation 
of splitting firms’ prospects. However, it is possible that the positive announcement returns 
associated with stock splits are driven by investor over-reaction. 
For example, stock splits may attract retail investors’ attention and lead to net purchasing 
from these investors (Barber and Odean, 2008). However, as shown by Figure 1, Figure 2 and 
Table 3, there is no significant price reversal in the subsequent trading days, suggesting that it 
is unlikely driven by thre short-term price pressure from investors’ attention.16  
Given that the price pressure could be long-lived,17 we rule out this alternative explanation 
by examining the long-run stock performance following stock splits. If the positive 
announcement returns are due to investors’ overreaction to split events, the long-run stock 
performance should be significantly negative.  
We examine the long-run stock performance following splits using both the buy-and-hold 
abnormal return approach and the calendar-time portfolio approach. The results are reported in 
Table D2 of Appendix D. Neither approach shows any return reversal in the long-run; on the 
contrary, there is some evidence for positive price drift.  
6.2 Stock Splits and Financial Flexibility 
Rankine and Stice (1997a; 1997b) propose that the magnitude of the split announcement 
effect should depend on the accounting treatment of stock splits, and should be larger when the 
new shares are funded by retained earnings. Their argument is that a reduction in retained 
earnings restricts firms’ financial flexibility in paying cash dividends and makes debt covenants 
                                                             
16 Seasholes and Wu (2007) use the setting of price limits on the Chinese stock market to proxy for attention-grabbing events, 
and document price reversal within a week. 
17 For instance, Loughran and Ritter (1995) find that IPO and SEO stocks underperform matched stocks in the subsequent 5 
years. 
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more likely to be violated, so it increases the cost of stock splits and makes them more credible 
signals.  
This financial flexibility explanation, however, is unlikely to hold in China. First, unlike 
the accounting treatment in the U.S., firms in China only need to transfer the par value of a 
share from retained earnings into capital stock when they conduct stock splits. The par value 
of almost every listed stock in China is one RMB, and in most of time is far below the stock 
price. As a result, even if firms use their retained earnings to fund stock splits, their financial 
flexibility would not be severely restricted as the U.S. firms do. Second, Table 1 shows that the 
majority of new shares issued in stock splits are funded by capital surplus. In China, capital 
surplus is not allowed to be paid out as dividends, and capital surplus is also not related to past 
performance.  
To further rule out the financial flexibility channel, we consider stock splits funded by 
retained earnings and capital surplus separately. To do this, we define Split from Retained 
Earnings, which is the ratio of new shares funded by retained earnings as a fraction of the initial 
total outstanding share and Split from Capital Surplus, which is the ratio of new shares funded 
by capital surplus. The result after adding Split from Retained Earnings and Split from Capital 
Surplus, reported in Column (1) of Table 13, shows that the announcement effect of stock splits 
continues to be significantly positive, regardless of how the stock splits are funded. 
6.3 Stock Splits and Liquidity 
Whether stock splits improve or impede liquidity is still inconclusive. Prior studies 
document that stock splits are associated with higher commission fees (Copeland, 1979; 
Brennan and Copeland, 1988a; Brennan and Hughes, 1991) and wider bid-ask spread 
(Copeland, 1979; Conroy et al., 1990), which would increase transaction costs. However, 
according to the survey of Baker and Gallagher (1980) and Baker and Powell (1993), firm 
managers believe that stock splits help make stocks more marketable. Lin et al. (2009) also 
find that trading continuity increases while liquidity risks decreases following stock splits.  
The test on the pre-split share price in Table 12 has partially ruled out the liquidity channel. 
To further mitigate the concern that the expected liquidity improvement drives our results, we 
add into the baseline regression two variables, ΔIlliquidity and ΔTurnover, measured as the 
change of the Amihud (2002) illiquidity ratio and the turnover ratio from the pre-announcement 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3541201
 22 
date to the post ex-date.18 We multiply the raw value of ΔIlliquidity by 108 and present the 
results in Column (2) of Table 13. 
The coefficient of ΔIlliquidity is significantly negative and the coefficient of ΔTurnover 
is significantly positive, implying that the improvement in stock liquidity after splits may also 
contribute to the positive announcement effect. However, our main finding is not affected as 
the coefficient of Split Ratio is still positive and highly significant. 
6.4 Stock Splits and Return Volatility 
Prior studies find that stocks become more volatile following splits (Ohlson and Penman, 
1985; Lamoureux and Poon, 1987; Brennan and Copeland, 1988b; Sheikh, 1989; Dubofsky, 
1991; Koski, 1998; Shue and Townsend, 2018). Constantinides (1984) argues that volatility is 
valuable as volatile stocks have tax option value. Lamoureux and Poon (1987) find evidence 
that the incremental value in the tax timing option determines the stock splits announcement 
effect. 
 However, the tax option value mechanism is not applicable in China, as capital loss 
cannot be used to deduct income taxes under China’s tax law. To further account for the 
influence of volatility change, column (3) of Table 13 controls for ΔVolatility, measured as the 
difference of return volatility between the [11, 70] post ex-date window and the [-70, -11] pre-
announcement window. 19  The coefficient estimate of Split Ratio is not sensitive to the 
inclusion of ΔVolatility. 
6.5 Stock Splits and Shareholder Base 
Merton (1987) and Amihud, Mendelson, and Uno (1999) predict that stock splits could 
increase firm value if they broaden shareholder base, which enables better risk sharing among 
investors and reduces discount rates. Mukherji, Kim, and Walker (1997) find that the 
announcement returns of stock splits are positively correlated with changes in the total number 
of shareholders.  
To account for this possibility, column (4) of Table 13 controls for ΔShareholders, 
                                                             
18 Illiquidity post ex-date is the average daily Amihud (2002) illiquidity in the [11, 70] post ex-date window, the illiquidity 
pre-announcement is the average illiquidity in the [-70, -11] pre-announcement window. If a firm does not make ex-right price 
adjustment, we assume the pseudo ex-date is 75 days after the profit distribution proposal announcement date, which is the 
averaged time lag between the announcement date and ex-date. Turnover is defined similarly.    
19 If a firm does not make ex-right price adjustment, we assume the ex-date is 75 days after the profit distribution proposal 
announcement date, which is the averaged time lag between the announcement date and the ex-date. 
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measured as the change of the number of shareholders around stock splits scaled by market 
capitalization. 20  Consistent with the shareholder base argument, the coefficient of 
ΔShareholders is positive and significant. Nevertheless, this does not affect the main results as 
the coefficient of Split Ratio continues to be significantly positive and the economic magnitude 
is similar to the baseline result. 
6.6 Stock Splits and Information Production 
According to the information production theory of Brennan and Hughes (1991), stock 
splits could motivate information intermediaries such as analysts to produce more information 
because brokerage commissions are inversely related to the nominal share price in the U.S. 
This explanation does not apply to the stock splits of Chinese listed companies since brokerage 
commissions in China are proportional to the total transaction amount and independent of share 
prices. Nevertheless, to address such a concern, column (5) of Table 13 adds into the baseline 
regression an additional control variable ΔCoverage, which is the change of analyst coverage 
around the stock split scaled by the market capitalization (in millions). While ΔCoverage enters 
the regression positively and significantly as predicted by the information production theory, 
the main results are qualitatively similar. 
Finally, in the last column of Table 13, we add all the aforementioned variables from 
section 6.2 to section 6.3 in the regression, and the corresponding result is unchanged. 
 
7. Conclusion 
In this paper, we propose and test a behavioral signaling explanation in the spirit of Baker, 
Mendel, and Wurgler (2015) to understand the puzzling announcement effects of stock splits. 
There are two key behavioral ingredients in our model. First, investors believe low-priced 
stocks to have greater price appreciation potential and have optimistic expectation about stocks 
of splitting firms. Second, investors have reference-dependent preference and will be 
particularly disappointed when the firm’s ex-post performance falls short of expectation. In 
equilibrium, only managers with favorable private information use stock splits to signal their 
                                                             
20 Data on the number of shareholders are available only after 2003 and are in quarterly frequency, so the shareholder number 
change is the number of shareholders at the end of the 2nd quarter minus the number at the end of the 4th quarter in the prior 
year, and the sample used here starts from 2004.  
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information.  
We test the novel predictions of the behavioral signaling explanation using a 
comprehensive sample of stock splits in China over the period of 1998 to 2017. Our empirical 
evidence is largely consistent with behavioral signaling explanation. First, splitting firms have 
better fundamentals compared with non-splitting firms after splits. Second, the market reacts 
positively to the announcements of stock splits and the announcement returns increase with the 
split ratio. Third, the announcement effect is more pronounced among firms mainly held by 
retail investors and with low pre-split share prices. We also find that splitting firms with subpar 
ex-post performance experience lower returns, compared with similarly underperforming firms 
without undergoing splits. Overall, our paper shows the promise of applying the behavioral 
approach to shed light on certain corporate events that are otherwise difficult to rationalize 
under rational framework. 
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Appendix A: Variable Definitions 
Variables Definitions 
CAR[t1, t2] 
Cumulative abnormal returns over [t1, t2], where t1 and t2 refer to the t1th and t2th trading 
days relative to the event date (t=0). In regression analysis, abnormal returns are raw 
returns adjusted by size and book-to-market ratio 
Split Dummy A dummy variable equals one for firms conducting stock splits and zero otherwise  
Split Ratio 
The ratio of newly issued shares from stock splits as a fraction of the original number 
of shares outstanding. 
LnCoverage 
Natural logarithm of 1 plus the total number of analysts who issue analyst reports for 
the firm. 
ΔEarnings 
After 2003 (including 2003), ΔEarnings is the difference of the current 4th quarter 
earnings and the preceding fiscal year 4th quarter earrings deflated by prior year market 
capitalization. Before 2002, ΔEarnings is half of the difference of current 2nd half-year-
earnings and the preceding year 2nd half-year-earrings deflated by prior year market 
capitalization.  
ΔDividends 
The cash dividends change relative to the prior year deflated by prior year market 
capitalization 
Annual Report 
A dummy variable that equals one if the profit distribution proposal is disclosed together 
with the annual report and zero otherwise 
LnSize 
Natural logarithm of previous month total market capitalization if the firm’s profit 
distribution plan is disclosed in the second half of the month, and will be lagged by an 
additional month if the firm’s profit distribution plan is disclosed in the first half 
LnBM 
Natural logarithm of the book-to-market ratio, where book value is the last fiscal year 
end total book equity, market value is the previous month total equity capitalization if 
the firm’s profit distribution plan is disclosed in the second half of the month, and will 
be lagged by an additional month if the firm’s profit distribution plan is disclosed in the 
first half 
Ret[-12, -2] 
Cumulative stock returns over past 11 months during [-12, -2] if the firm’s profit 
distribution plan is disclosed in the second half of the month, and will be lagged by an 
additional month if a firm’s profit distribution plan is disclosed in the first half  
(cumulative returns over [-13, -3]) 
ROA Operating income deflated by total assets  
ΔSales Sales growth rate relative to the last year 
ΔShareholder21 
The difference of the number of registered shareholders in the current quarter end 
relative to the last quarter deflated by equity capitalization 
Max(0, Quarterly Return) Absolute value of quarterly stock return if the current quarter return is positive 
Max(0, - Quarterly Return) Absolute value of quarterly stock return if the current quarter return is negative 
10% Price Limit The number of trading days that reach the 10% price limit in the current quarter 
-10% Price Limit The number of trading days that reach the -10% price limit in the current quarter 
Abnormal Volume 
Quarterly RMB trading volume relative to the average trading volume in the prior 4 
quarters 
                                                             
21 Referring to the dependent variable used in the Table 7  
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Retail Investor Sentiment[t1, t2] 
the number of positive posts minus the number of negative posts deflated by the sum of 
positive and negative posts over [t1, t2] 
Daily Return[-10, -1] Daily cumulative stock returns over [-10, -1] 
Forecast Revision 
The revision of analyst consensus forecast of the earnings before and after the profit 
distribution announcement deflated by prior year market capitalization 
LnCoverage Natural logarithm of the number of analysts who issue analyst reports for the firm 
Earnings Volatility 
Standard deviation of earnings in the past three years deflated by prior year market 
capitalization 
Underperform 
In each year for each analyst covered stock, we compute the difference between the 
next-year-realized net income and analysts’ median forecast and sort the difference into 
4 quartiles. Underperform is a dummy variable which equals 1 if a firm belongs to the 
lowest quartile and equals 0 otherwise 
Institutional Holdings The proportion of shares held by institutional investors 
LnPrice  
Natural logarithm of the stock’s previous month closing price if a firm’s profit 
distribution plan is disclosed in the second half of the month, and will be lagged by an 
additional month if a firm’s profit distribution plan is disclosed in the first half of the 
month 
Split from Retained Earnings 
The ratio of newly issued shares funded by retained earnings as a fraction of the initial 
number of shares outstanding 
Split from Capital Surplus 
The ratio of newly issued shares funded by capital surplus as a fraction of the initial 
number of shares outstanding 
ΔIlliquidity 
The difference of averaged post-ex-day [10, 70] and pre-announcement [-70, -10] 
Amihud(2002) illiquidity measure, for firms without a true ex-day, the day 75 days after 
the profit distribution announcement date is defined to be the pseudo ex-day  
ΔTurnover 
The difference of averaged post-ex-day [10, 70] and pre-announcement [-70, -10] daily 
stock turnover ratio, for firms without a true ex-day, the day 75 days after the profit 
distribution announcement date is defined to be the pseudo ex-day 
ΔVolatility 
The difference of averaged post-ex-day [10, 70] and pre-announcement [-70, -10] return 
volatility, for firms without a true ex-day, the day 75 days after the profit distribution 
announcement date is defined to be the pseudo ex-day 
ΔCoverage The change of analyst coverage before and after stock splits 
ΔShareholder22 
The change of shareholder number before stock splits announcement and after stock 
splits implementation 
  
                                                             
22 Referring to the variable used in the Table 13 
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Appendix B: Stock Splits in China, an Example of Meters Bonwe 
In this section, we use Meters Bonwe’s 2014 annual distribution proposal to illustrate how 
Chinese listed companies disclose stock splits and why this common practice easily leads to 
investors’ misperception about stock splits. 
Meters Bonwe is a Shenzhen stock exchange listed company (stock code 002269) in the 
apparel industry. Meters Bonwe declared a 3 for 2 stock splits (split ratio 1.5) in its 2014 annual 
distribution proposal on April 1, 2015 combined with the firm’s 2014 annual report.  
 Meters Bonwe posted its 2014 annual distribution proposal under “Important Notes”, 
which belongs to the 1st section and is in the first page of the firm’s 2014 annual report. Meters 
Bonwe declared the following information 
“Our company’s annual profit distribution proposal approved by the board of directors is: 
“Based our company’s total outstanding shares, 1,011,000,000 in the end of December 2014, 
for every 10 outstanding shares, an investor would get 5 shares from retained earnings, 1 RMB 
cash dividends, 9 shares from capital surplus and 1 shares from surplus reserve23”      
In the director’s report, which is the 4th section of Meters Bonwe’s 2014 annual report, 
Meters Bonwe also has a specific part for its distribution proposal, and provides the following 
table 
New shares from Retained Earnings for every 10 outstanding shares 5  
Cash dividends for every 10 outstanding shares 1 
New shares from capital surplus and surplus reserve for every 10 outstanding shares 10 
Total shares outstanding 1,011,000,000 
Total cash dividends 101,100,000 
Total distributable net income 145,640,513.00 
                                                             
23 Surplus reserve is part of retained earnings. 
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Appendix C: Behavioral Signaling Model 
Our toy model contains two players, a manager, who want to trade off the short term and 
long-term stock prices, and a representative naïve investor who has biased expectations about 
splitting stocks and are loss averse. The manager manages a firm with an uncertain value V that 
is realized in the second period. The manager also receives a private signal e about V in the 
first period, but this signal is only partially informative, and an unobservable shock ε will affect 
V. For simplicity, we assume that V is determined by adding up e and ε. 
V = e + ε  (1) 
Here e is the manager’s private information about firm value, unobservable to outside 
investors, so the manager needs to choose a stock split ratio s to convey his private information. 
In our model, both e and ε are random variables from outside investors’ perspective, with 
probability functions fe and fε defined over support  0 e，  and  0 ， , respectively. Fe and Fε 
are the corresponding cumulative density functions for e and ε. 
For various reasons we discussed above, the naïve investor believes splitting firms have 
higher growth potential and better fundamentals. Whenever he sees a stock split event, he raises 
the expectation of the splitting firm’s value by as, where a (a>0 ) is a parameter used to measure 
the degree of this naïve investor’s optimism about stock splits.  
The representative investor has a non-standard utility function, where utility is defined not 
with respect to the level of wealth but relative to a reference point. In addition, the investor is 
loss averse so that a given loss generates larger utility loss than an equivalent gain. Specifically, 
the investors’ utility function is taking the form of the following equation:  
Ui = V + b (V - VE) I (V < VE)  (2) 
In the above formula, I (.) is an indicator function that takes the value 1 if the condition in 
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the bracket is satisfied and 0 if not. b is a positive constant reflecting the asymmetry of gain 
and loss on utility. VE is investors’ expectation of firm value after seeing stock splits, and it is 
an increasing function of the split ratio s. Without loss of generality, we use the simple linear 
function to reflect the impact of stock splits on the investors’ expectation.  
VE = as  (3) 
Manager’s utility is determined by both the current stock price and the future stock price. 
Given his private information e, the manager chooses a split ratio s to maximize the weighted 
average shareholder value. Baker, Mendel and Wurgler (2015) use a similar method to model 
the manager’s optimization problem when deciding dividends payout.  
s = argmaxs E[αμ(s) + β Ui | e]  (4) 
whereμ(s) is investors’ expectation of firm value conditional on receiving the stock split signal 
s. Plug (2) and (3) into (4), we could get the following formula:  
       
         
s
0
s
0
0
+ 0 5
as e
as e
s argmax s b e r as f r dr I as e
argmax M s e r as f r dr I as e


 



     
    


 
In (5), M is a simplified parameter equals
b


, which ensures the equivalence of the optimization 
problem.  
We use Perfect Bayesian equilibrium (henceforth PBE) as the equilibrium concept. In PBE, 
the following two conditions must be satisfied at the same time: 
(1) Given manager’s private information e, belief functionμ(s) and the effect of splits on 
naïve investor’s utility Ui, s maximizes manager’s utility.  
(2) Belief consistency. In equilibrium, the market makes a correct conjecture, in other 
words, e =μ(s). 
Lemma 1. In equilibrium,μ(s) is a weakly increasing function of the split ratio s. 
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We prove Lemma 1 by contradiction. Suppose not, if there are splitting ratios s1 and s2, 
with s1 < s2, butμ(s1) >μ(s2). Denoting e1 and e2 as the firms’ private information with 
corresponding split ratios s1 and s2, then according to incentive comparability condition, the 
following two inequalities must hold. 
               
1 1 2 1
1 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 2 1
0 0
as e as e
M s e r as f r dr I as e M s e r as f r dr I as e
 
 
 
            
               
2 2 1 2
2 2 2 2 2 1 2 1 1 2
0 0
as e as e
M s e r as f r dr I as e M s e r as f r dr I as e  
 
            
However, the second one could not be true. On the one hand, by assumption we haveμ
(s1) >μ(s2), on the other hand, since s1 < s2, to make the inequality plausible, the following 
inequity            
2 2 1 2
2 2 2 2 2 1 1 2
0 0
as e as e
e r as f r dr I as e e r as f r dr I as e
 
 
       , must be 
true. However, because for any e, the function      
0
as e
e r as f r dr I as e


    is not 
increasing in s, which leads to a contradiction, soμ(s) cannot be decreasing in s. That explains 
why a firm has the incentive to do stock splits because, in the short run, the firm could be 
recognized by the market as a higher type if the split ratio is larger. 
Asμ(s) is weakly monotonic, we could take the derivative with respect to s in manager’s 
utility maximization problem and derive the following first-order condition:  
      =0 (6)M s aF I as eas e    
Plugging in the belief consistency condition e =μ(s) into the above equation, we could get the 
following differential equation:  
   =0 (7)Me aF I as eas e    
It is easy to show that when the indicative function I (as > e) takes different values, the 
differential equation has different forms of solutions. 
When the split ratio s is lower compared to e, and as < e, thenμ(s) is a constant. This 
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result is reasonable because when s is smaller than
e
a
, share splitting is not a credible signal, 
as it incurs no cost. 
When the split ratio s is large enough satisfying
e
s
a
 , equation (7) has a linear solution, 
and our following analysis will focus on this particular solution. 
Equilibrium. For a manager with private information e, his choice of split ratio s is given 
by 
 s (e) = e / a + c  (8), 
where c is a constant that solves  
2
M
F c
a

  . Equation (8) provides the separating 
equilibrium of the behavioral signaling model. 
The separating equilibrium predicts that stock splits with larger share splitting ratio should 
be associated with larger stock returns, because a firm with more favorable private information 
would select a larger share splitting ratio to separate itself from other firms. 
Another empirical prediction of the behavioral separating equilibrium is that when we 
regress stock splits event returns on stock splits ratio, the regression coefficient would be larger 
if unsophisticated investors have more optimistic misconceptions about stock splits (larger a). 
The reason is that when unsophisticated investors are very optimistic about stock splits, only 
firms with very good fundamentals can manage to not disappoint investors ex-post and conduct 
large ratio stock splits. In other words, the information content for a given stock splits ratio 
should be larger if the parameter a is larger. 
  
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3541201
 36 
Appendix D: Additional Results 
D1. Alternative Model Specifications 
To assure the robustness of the empirical evidence documented in Table 5, in this section, 
we conduct several additional tests using different samples and different model specifications 
and report the corresponding results in Table D1. In Column (1) and (2), we repeat the 
regression analysis with controls and fixed effects used in Table 5 but using a PSM matched 
sample. In each year, we use the propensity score matching procedure to find a non-splitting 
firm that is similar to the splitting firm in a set of observable characteristics.24 When we use 
the matched sample, Split Ratio continues to be significantly positive and the magnitudes are 
similar to those of the full sample. In Column (3) and (4), we adopt the Fama-Macbeth (1973) 
procedure and run cross-sectional regressions year by year, the regression coefficient of Split 
Ratio on cumulative abnormal returns remains to be significantly positive. Ultimately, in the 
last two columns of Table D1, we only keep stock splitting firms in the regression sample, the 
positive association between Split Ratio and market reaction is unchanged.  
D2. Long-term Event Study of Stock Splits 
In this section, we conduct long-term event study for stock splits to examine whether the 
short-term price impact would be reversed in the long run. 
As there is no consensus optimal method to compute long-run post event stock 
performance in literature, we use both the buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHAR) and 
calendar-time portfolio approaches to examine the long-term market reaction to stock splits.  
The key idea of BHAR approach is to compare a stock’s long-run performance to the 
performance of a benchmark portfolio. This method more closely reflects investors’ true 
investing experience. Following the literature, we compute the buy-and-hold abnormal returns 
for every splitting stock according to the following equation:  
       , , , ,11+ 1+ 1
sns s s s
i t s i t j s t s j tBHAR R R
  
  
      
where i indicates splitting stock, j indicates the benchmark portfolio to which stock i is 
compared. The superscript [s, s+τ] indicates that splitting stocks are held for τ months, from 
the beginning of the month s to the end of the month s+τ. For every splitting stock, we choose 
                                                             
24 The firm characteristics include LnSize, LnBM, LnPrice (the natural logarithm of last month’s closing price), ΔEarnings, 
ΔDividends, Split Capacity (capital surplus plus retained earnings per share, which determines the maximal split ratio), ROA 
(return on asset), Age (number of years that a firm has been listed), and industry affiliations (22 industries based on the industry 
classification of China Securities Regulatory Commission). 
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a benchmark portfolio that is not periodically rebalanced to avoid rebalancing bias (Barber and 
Lyon, 1997). ns is the number of stocks in the benchmark portfolio, ωi,s is each stock’s weight 
in the benchmark portfolio. We compute the mean BHAR  across all the splitting stocks 
according to the following equation, where N is the total number of split events. 
 
1
= 2
N
iBHAR BHAR  
Since the BHAR is the difference of a τ month buy-and-hold return between a stock and a 
benchmark portfolio, the distribution of BHAR is often highly skewed and does not have a zero 
mean (Barber and Lyon, 1997). We follow the method of Brock, Lakonishok and LeBaron 
(1992), Ikenberry, Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1995), Ikenberry, Rankine, and Stice (1996), 
and draw statistical inference based on an empirically generated distribution.  
For every stock announcing split at event month t, we randomly select a non-splitting stock 
with similar observable characteristics (for example, same industry, size, and book-to-market 
ratio depending on the benchmark portfolio we use) in the same month. This process continues 
until every splitting stock is matched by a non-splitting stock. We then form a pseudo portfolio 
constructed using non-splitting stocks and estimate the pBHAR in the same way as we do for the 
splitting stocks.25 The above procedure is repeated for 1,000 times so as to derive 1,000 pBHAR
s, and hence the empirical distribution of BHAR under the null of no abnormal returns. The null 
hypothesis tested is that the event BHAR  equals the mean long-run abnormal return for the 
1,000 pseudo-event portfolios.  
The Panel A of Table D2 reports the results of BHAR approach and Figure D1 reports the 
empirical distribution. We use the value-weighted market return, 22 industry portfolio returns, 
and 25 size and B/M ratio sorted portfolio returns as the expected returns, and look at a three-
year holding period [1, 36] as well as three one-year holding period BHARs. The statistic we 
use is p-value, which is the fraction of pBHAR s from the empirical distribution that are larger 
than BHAR  . yh and yl are the 95th and 5th percentile of pBHAR  of the empirical distribution, 
respectively. If BHAR  is lower (higher) than yl (yh), then splitting stocks significantly 
                                                             
25 For example, if we want to compare the long-run performance of splitting and non-splitting firms in the same industry, the 
benchmark portfolios used are the 22 valued-weighted industry portfolios. The pseudo stock for each event stock is randomly 
selected from the same industry. Similarly, if we want to compare the long-run performance of split and non-splitting stocks 
with comparable size and book-to-market ratio, we use the 25 value-weighted size and book-to-market ratio independently 
sorted portfolios as the benchmarks, and the pseudo stock for each event stock is randomly picked from the size and book-to-
market matched portfolio. 
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underperform (outperform) non-splitting stocks in the long run at the 5% significance level.  
The result of Table D2 Panel A shows that splitting stocks significantly outperform the 
benchmark portfolio over the subsequent 36 months. This finding is consistent with evidence 
from the US (Ikenberry, Rankine and Stice, 1996; Desai and Jain, 1997; Ikenberry and Ramnath, 
2002), indicating that investors to some extent under-react to the information contained in stock 
splits. The result also reveals that the return differences between splitting stocks and the 
benchmark portfolio is largest during the first year post-split and gradually decline over time.   
We also use the calendar-time portfolio approach as this method naturally addresses the 
cross-sectional correlation in stock returns (Fama, 1998). Under this method, the long-run 
performance of stock splits could be inferred from the alphas estimated from the time-series 
regression of portfolio returns on asset pricing factors.  
Specifically, in each month, we select all the stocks announcing splits in the previous 36 
months and form a portfolio containing all such stocks. We then hold this portfolio for 1 month 
and rebalance monthly to include stocks that just conducted splits in the last month and remove 
stocks whose most recent splits occurred more than 36 months ago.   
Table D2 Panel B reports the calendar-time portfolio results, with the upper part showing 
the equal-weighted portfolio returns, and the lower part showing the value-weighted portfolio 
returns. Column (1) shows that the equal-weighted portfolio earns 1.5% excess returns per 
month, significant at the 5% level. In the following four columns, we estimate alphas using 
standard asset pricing models including the CAPM, the Fama-French 3 factor model (Fama 
and French, 1993), the Carhart 4 factor model (Carhart, 1997), and the Fama-French 5 factor 
model (Fama and French, 2015). While alpha estimates are sensitive to the factor models used, 
they are never significantly negative. In Column (6), we follow Liu, Stambaugh and Yuan 
(2019) and use the CH-3 factors as the pricing model, and document a significant positive alpha. 
26In the second to the fourth row, we select stocks conducting splits in the previous [1, 12] 
months, [13, 24] months and [25, 36] months, respectively. The results show that when we 
examine the long-run performance year by year, we do not find any evidence of return reversal. 
The results for the value-weighted returns are qualitatively similar as shown in the bottom part 
of Table D2 Panel B.  
                                                             
26 We thank Jianan Liu for providing the data to us. 
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Figure 1. Market Reaction to Stock Splits Announcement over [-20, 20] 41 trading days 
This figure plots the average cumulative abnormal returns of stock splits announcements of China’s listed firms over the [-20, 
20] event window. Stock returns are adjusted by size and book-to-market ratio.  
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Figure 2. Market Reaction to Stock Splits Announcement over [-20, 91] 121 trading days 
This figure plots the average cumulative abnormal returns of stock splits announcements of China’s listed firms over the [-20, 
90] event window. Stock returns are adjusted by size and book-to-market ratio.  
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Table 1. Yearly Distribution of Stock Splits in China 
This table reports the distribution of stock splits of China’s listed firms for each year from 1998 to 2017.  
 
Year 
Splitting  
Events 
Splitting  
Firms 
Percentage of  
Splitting Firms 
Splitting Events in Annual and Semi-annual Distribution Proposals 
Mean Splitting 
Ratio 
Source of New Shares 
Annual Semi-Annual 
Retained 
Earnings 
Capital 
Surplus 
Splitting 
Events 
In Annual Report Splitting 
Events 
In Semi-Annual Report 
Yes No Yes No 
1998 262 258 31.46% 206 185 21 56 51 5 0.423 48.11% 51.89% 
1999 233 227 24.62% 176 110 66 57 25 32 0.466 40.91% 59.09% 
2000 178 178 16.76% 131 114 17 47 41 6 0.48 29.74% 70.26% 
2001 197 190 16.74% 159 152 7 38 32 6 0.466 28.18% 71.82% 
2002 165 158 13.16% 134 124 10 31 31 0 0.365 22.88% 77.12% 
2003 148 147 11.62% 124 118 6 24 23 1 0.461 18.50% 81.50% 
2004 236 233 17.21% 196 191 5 40 38 2 0.533 16.07% 83.93% 
2005 170 168 12.43% 159 157 2 11 11 0 0.452 12.01% 87.99% 
2006 187 185 12.90% 153 147 6 34 34 0 0.463 16.32% 83.68% 
2007 219 211 13.84% 180 173 7 39 39 0 0.470 23.42% 76.58% 
2008 404 402 25.31% 371 368 3 33 32 1 0.563 20.49% 79.51% 
2009 236 234 13.36% 221 219 2 15 15 0 0.489 18.76% 81.24% 
2010 381 375 17.81% 341 335 6 40 35 5 0.545 21.19% 78.81% 
2011 615 611 26.11% 563 543 20 52 47 5 0.658 11.77% 88.23% 
2012 575 573 23.20% 542 439 103 33 22 11 0.649 6.31% 93.69% 
2013 460 456 18.15% 430 317 113 30 18 12 0.659 6.93% 93.07% 
2014 510 505 18.50% 465 313 152 45 13 32 0.724 6.13% 93.87% 
2015 741 716 24.50% 566 380 186 175 70 105 0.947 6.19% 93.81% 
2016 588 581 18.06% 532 359 173 56 24 32 1.042 4.93% 95.07% 
2017 478 475 13.22% 437 312 125 41 31 10 0.768 4.45% 95.45% 
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics  
This table reports the summary statistics of the main variables used in regression analyses. CAR[-10, -2], CAR[-1, 1], CAR[-
10, 1], and CAR[2, 10] are cumulative abnormal returns over the event windows in brackets, respectively, where abnormal 
returns are raw returns adjusted by size and book-to-market ratio. Split Dummy equals one for firms conducting stock splits 
and zero otherwise. Split Ratio is the ratio of newly issued shares from stock splits as a fraction of the original number of 
shares outstanding. ΔDividends is the cash dividends change relative to the prior year deflated by prior year market 
capitalization. ΔEarnings is the seasonal earnings change deflated by prior year market capitalization. Annual Report is a 
dummy variable that equals one if the profit distribution proposal is disclosed together with the annual report and zero 
otherwise. LnSize and LnBM are the natural logarithm of total market capitalization and the book-to-market ratio, respectively. 
Ret[-12, -2] is the compounded 11-month returns over [-12, -2]. The sample period is from 1998 to 2017. ***, ** and * indicate 
statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.  
 
Panel A. Summary Statistics 
Variable N Mean Std. dev P25 P50 P75 
CAR[-10, -2] 28771 0.006 0.071 -0.032 -0.001 0.037 
CAR[-1, 1]  28771 -0.002 0.049 -0.030 -0.005 0.021 
CAR[-10, 1]  28771 0.005 0.084 -0.043 -0.003 0.042 
CAR[2, 10] 28771 0.002 0.072 -0.037 -0.006 0.031 
Split Dummy 28771 0.179 0.383 0 0 0 
Split Ratio 28771 0.110 0.289 0 0 0 
ΔDividends 26913 0.001 0.009 -0.001 0 0.002 
ΔEarnings 26590 0.002 0.030 -0.004 0 0.005 
Annual Report 28771 0.962 0.191 1 1 1 
LnSize 28572 14.572 1.215 13.653 14.526 15.399 
LnBM 28407 -1.155 0.651 -1.567 -1.13 -0.706 
Ret[-12, -2] 28771 0.163 0.619 -0.240 0.009 0.382 
 
 
Panel B. Differences between Splitting Firms and Non-Splitting Firms 
 Non-splitting Firm Splitting Firm Difference  
Variables Mean Median Std. dev Mean Median Std. dev in Means t Value 
CAR[-10, -2] 0.003 -0.003 0.070 0.022 0.014 0.074 -0.019*** (-17.06) 
CAR[-1, 1]  -0.006 -0.008 0.046 0.018 0.012 0.06 -0.024*** (-32.58) 
CAR[-10, 1]  -0.003 -0.009 0.08 0.040 0.03 0.091 -0.043*** (-33.93) 
CAR[2, 10] 0.002 -0.006 0.072 0.000 -0.006 0.072 0.001 (1.32) 
ΔDividends 0.000 0.000 0.009 0.001 0.000 0.01 -0.001*** (-4.55) 
ΔEarnings 0.002 0.000 0.031 0.005 0.001 0.018 -0.003*** (-5.44) 
Annual Report 0.989 1 0.105 0.839 1 0.367 0.149*** (53.28) 
LnSize 14.57 14.53 1.223 14.58 14.511 1.177 -0.010 (-0.55) 
LnBM -1.123 -1.088 0.658 -1.305 -1.292 0.593 0.182*** (18.24) 
Ret[-12, -2] 0.132 -0.013 0.601 0.307 0.142 0.678 -0.176*** (-18.55) 
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Table 3. Market Reaction to Stock Splits: Univariate Analysis 
This table reports the cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) around split announcements in various windows. We exclude 
observations when stock trading is suspended during [-1, 1] to mitigate the impact of other major corporate events. The row 
labels correspond to different expected return models used in computing CARs. ER is the excess return relative to risk-free 
rate. MKT is the abnormal return in excess of value-weighted market index. IND is the abnormal return in excess of firm’s 
corresponding value-weighted industry portfolio. CHA is the abnormal return in excess of the firm’s matched value-weighted 
5×5 size and book-to-market ratio portfolio. CAPM, FF-3, and FF-5 represent risk-adjusted abnormal returns, where we use 
CAPM, Fama-French (1993) 3-factor model and Fama-French (2015) 3-factor model to compute expected returns, respectively. 
Parameters in CAPM, FF-3 and FF-5 approach are all estimated within the [-120, -21] pre-announcement window. The sample 
period is from 1998 to 2017, the numbers reported in parentheses are t statistics with standard error clustered by firm and event 
date, ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
 
  -1 0 1 [-10, -2] [-5,-2] [-1, 1] [2, 5] [2, 10] 
ER 
0.007*** 0.009*** 0.002*** 0.033*** 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.004*** 0.01*** 
(14.96) (15.41) (4.15) (24.17) (19.90) (19.04) (4.93) (7.46) 
MKT 
0.007*** 0.009*** 0.001*** 0.025*** 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.000 0.003*** 
(16.24) (16.03) (3.45) (22.53) (21.29) (19.92) (0.59) (2.64) 
IND 
0.007*** 0.009*** 0.001*** 0.023*** 0.016*** 0.018*** 0.000 0.001 
(17.31) (16.58) (3.30) (21.28) (21.38) (20.74) (-0.23) (1.27) 
CHA 
0.007*** 0.009*** 0.001*** 0.021*** 0.015*** 0.018*** -0.001 0.000 
(18.22) (16.89) (3.58) (20.64) (21.06) (21.50) (-0.75) (0.09) 
CAPM 
0.007*** 0.009*** 0.002*** 0.028*** 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.001 0.005*** 
(16.91) (16.53) (3.97) (23.39) (22.36) (20.82) (1.87) (4.88) 
FF-3 
0.007*** 0.010*** 0.001*** 0.021*** 0.016*** 0.018*** -0.001 0.001 
(17.84) (16.87) (3.40) (18.75) (20.55) (21.22) (-1.07) (1.22) 
FF-5 
0.007*** 0.009*** 0.001*** 0.023*** 0.015*** 0.018*** 0.001 0.001 
(15.18) (15.28) (3.11) (17.51) (16.35) (18.68) (0.77) (1.06) 
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Table 4. Market Reactions to Stock Splits: Regression Analysis 
This table reports regression analyses of short-run market reaction to stock splits. The dependent variables (CAR[-10, -2], CAR[-1, 1] and CAR[2, 10]) are cumulative abnormal returns over [-10, -2], 
[-1, 1] and [2, 10], respectively. Split Dummy equals one for firms conducting stock splits and zero otherwise. ΔDividends is the cash dividends change relative to the prior year deflated by prior year 
market capitalization. ΔEarnings is the seasonal earnings change deflated by prior year market capitalization. Annual Report is a dummy variable that equals one if the profit distribution proposal is 
disclosed together with the annual report and zero otherwise. LnSize and LnBM are the natural logarithm of total market capitalization and the book-to-market ratio, respectively. Ret[-12, -2] is the 
compounded 11-month returns over [-12, -2]. The sample period is from 1998 to 2017, the numbers reported in parentheses are t statistics with standard error clustered by firm and event date, ***, ** 
and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
CAR [-10, -2] [-1, 1] [2, 10] [-10, -2] [-1, 1] [2, 10] [-10, -2] [-1, 1] [2, 10] 
Split Dummy 0.017*** 0.024*** -0.002 0.016*** 0.023*** -0.001 0.017*** 0.025*** -0.000 
 (12.61) (23.28) (-1.61) (10.76) (20.27) (-0.73) (11.31) (21.51) (-0.29) 
ΔDividends    0.181*** 0.072** -0.053 0.209*** 0.105*** -0.020 
    (3.58) (2.13) (-1.00) (4.35) (3.13) (-0.37) 
ΔEarnings    0.123*** 0.034*** -0.001 0.130*** 0.054*** 0.002 
    (6.57) (3.11) (-0.03) (6.68) (4.69) (0.11) 
Annual Report    0.003 -0.012*** 0.002 0.002 -0.013*** 0.001 
    (0.66) (-3.99) (0.44) (0.50) (-4.22) (0.23) 
LnSize       -0.007*** -0.004*** -0.006*** 
       (-6.86) (-4.90) (-4.99) 
LnBM       0.003** 0.001 0.004*** 
       (2.26) (0.90) (2.76) 
CAR[-10, -2]        -0.069*** -0.009 
        (-9.10) (-0.89) 
Ret[-12, -2]       0.003* -0.003** 0.002 
       (1.68) (-2.50) (1.10) 
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Event Date Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.037 0.086 0.019 0.045 0.084 0.017 0.048 0.092 0.019 
Observations 28312 28312 28312 25941 25941 25941 25193 25193 25193 
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Table 5. Short-term Market Reactions to Stock Splits with Different Split Ratios 
This table reports regression analyses of short-run market reaction to stock splits with different share splitting ratio. The 
dependent variables (CAR[-1, 1] and CAR[-10, 1]) are cumulative abnormal returns over [-1, 1] and [-10, 1]. Split Ratio is the 
ratio of newly issued shares from stock splits as a fraction of the original number of shares outstanding. ΔDividends is the cash 
dividends change relative to the prior year deflated by prior year market capitalization. ΔEarnings is the seasonal earnings 
change deflated by prior year market capitalization. Annual Report is a dummy variable that equals one if the profit distribution 
proposal is disclosed together with the annual report and zero otherwise. LnSize and LnBM are the natural logarithm of total 
market capitalization and the book-to-market ratio, respectively. CAR[-10, -2] is cumulative abnormal returns over [-10, -2]. 
Ret[-12, -2] is the compounded 11 monthly returns over [-12, -2]. The sample period is from 1998 to 2017, the numbers 
reported in parentheses are t statistics with standard error clustered by firm and event date, ***, ** and * indicate statistical 
significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
CAR [-1, 1] [-10, -1] [-1, 1] [-10, -1] [-1, 1] [-10, -1] 
Split Ratio 0.039*** 0.069*** 0.037*** 0.069*** 0.041*** 0.072*** 
 (21.60) (23.54) (18.12) (20.94) (19.40) (22.34) 
ΔDividends   0.065* 0.239*** 0.099*** 0.289*** 
   (1.91) (4.22) (2.96) (5.32) 
ΔEarnings   0.033*** 0.155*** 0.054*** 0.173*** 
   (3.02) (7.61) (4.64) (7.94) 
Annual Report   -0.006* 0.004 -0.006** 0.002 
   (-1.94) (0.71) (-1.98) (0.46) 
LnSize     -0.004*** -0.011*** 
     (-5.09) (-8.45) 
LnBM     0.001 0.003** 
     (0.80) (2.15) 
CAR[-10, -2]     -0.074***  
     (-9.58)  
Ret[-12, -2]     -0.003*** -0.001 
     (-2.63) (-0.37) 
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Event Date Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.093 0.080 0.089 0.082 0.098 0.090 
Observations 28312 28312 25941 25941 25193 25193 
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Table 6. Fundamentals of Splitting Firm 
This table reports the fundamental performance of splitting firms in the year of and two years after the split. The dependent 
variable used in Panel A is ROA, defined as the operating income deflated by total assets. The dependent variable in Panel B 
is ΔEarnings, defined as earnings change relative to the earnings in year t-1and in Panel C is ΔSales, defined as sales growth 
rate relative to the sales in year t-1. Split Dummy equals one for firms conducting stock splits and zero otherwise. Split Ratio 
is the ratio of newly issued shares from stock splits as a fraction of the original number of shares outstanding. ΔDividends is 
the cash dividends change relative to the prior year deflated by prior year market capitalization. ΔEarnings is the seasonal 
earnings change deflated by prior year market capitalization. LnSize and LnBM are the natural logarithm of total market 
capitalization and the book-to-market ratio, respectively. The sample period is from 1998 to 2017, the numbers reported in 
parentheses are t statistics with standard error clustered by firm, ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 
10%, respectively. 
 
Panel A. Stock split and ROA  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 ROAt ROAt+1 ROAt+2 ROAt ROAt+1 ROAt+2 
Split Dummy 0.015*** 0.013*** 0.007***    
 (21.12) (12.05) (4.93)    
Split Ratio    0.016*** 0.015*** 0.009*** 
    (17.19) (10.51) (4.10) 
ΔDividends 0.013*** -0.002 -0.023*** 0.013*** -0.002 -0.023*** 
 (15.81) (-1.46) (-13.26) (15.86) (-1.43) (-13.27) 
ΔEarnings -0.013*** -0.041*** -0.058*** -0.013*** -0.041*** -0.058*** 
 (-11.48) (-24.72) (-23.74) (-11.47) (-24.68) (-23.73) 
LnSize 0.356*** 0.399*** 0.275*** 0.358*** 0.401*** 0.276*** 
 (27.61) (21.51) (11.35) (27.78) (21.65) (11.41) 
LnBM  0.535*** 0.365***  0.530*** 0.361*** 
  (13.98) (8.43)  (13.83) (8.36) 
ROAt-1  0.365*** 0.184***  0.368*** 0.185*** 
  (18.88) (8.62)  (18.99) (8.68) 
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry × Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.499 0.466 0.402 0.496 0.464 0.402 
Observations 26230 25393 25343 26230 25393 25343 
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Panel B. Stock split and Earnings Growth 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 ΔEarningst ΔEarningst+1 ΔEarningst+2 ΔEarningst ΔEarningst+1 ΔEarningst+2 
Split Dummy 0.011*** 0.008*** 0.003**    
 (15.98) (7.52) (2.16)    
Split Ratio    0.013*** 0.010*** 0.006*** 
    (11.86) (7.35) (2.86) 
ΔDividends 0.011*** -0.004*** -0.020*** 0.011*** -0.004*** -0.020*** 
 (14.35) (-3.57) (-12.20) (14.39) (-3.57) (-12.24) 
ΔEarnings -0.010*** -0.031*** -0.040*** -0.010*** -0.031*** -0.040*** 
 (-9.18) (-21.52) (-19.09) (-9.18) (-21.54) (-19.10) 
LnSize -0.495*** -0.368*** -0.499*** -0.493*** -0.366*** -0.499*** 
 (-41.20) (-24.95) (-25.28) (-41.00) (-24.82) (-25.26) 
LnBM  0.767*** 0.612***  0.763*** 0.609*** 
  (13.88) (9.96)  (13.81) (9.91) 
ROAt-1  0.732*** 0.558***  0.733*** 0.558*** 
  (25.96) (18.10)  (26.03) (18.12) 
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry × Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.221 0.344 0.291 0.219 0.343 0.291 
Observations 25907 25393 25343 25907 25393 25343 
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Panel C. Stock split and Sales Growth 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 ΔSalest ΔSalest+1 ΔSalest+2 ΔSalest ΔSalest+1 ΔSalest+2 
Split Dummy 0.104*** 0.161*** 0.188***    
 (9.78) (7.37) (5.73)    
Split Ratio    0.139*** 0.239*** 0.427*** 
    (8.69) (7.44) (9.02) 
ΔDividends 0.041*** -0.061*** -0.335*** 0.041*** -0.062*** -0.019 
 (4.81) (-2.96) (-9.00) (4.77) (-3.02) (-1.08) 
ΔEarnings -0.108*** -0.402*** -0.771*** -0.108*** -0.402*** -0.476*** 
 (-8.57) (-13.50) (-14.33) (-8.57) (-13.52) (-13.74) 
LnSize -1.673*** -2.108*** -2.962*** -1.656*** -2.081*** -1.965*** 
 (-13.68) (-7.31) (-6.80) (-13.58) (-7.23) (-5.86) 
LnBM  6.642*** 6.989***  6.545*** 9.563*** 
  (8.92) (6.87)  (8.81) (8.98) 
ROAt-1  3.518*** 3.782***  3.531*** 5.215*** 
  (8.20) (6.36)  (8.25) (8.53) 
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry × Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.054 0.130 0.174 0.054 0.130 0.072 
Observations 26201 25367 25307 26201 25367 25479 
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Table 7. Stock Split and the Number of Shareholders 
This table reports the impact of stock splits on number of shareholders. The dependent variable ΔShareholder is the difference 
of the number of registered shareholders in the current quarter end relative to the last quarter deflated by equity capitalization. 
Split Ratio is the ratio of newly issued shares from stock splits as a fraction of the original number of shares outstanding. 
ΔDividends is the cash dividends change relative to the prior year deflated by prior year market capitalization. ΔEarnings is 
the seasonal earnings change deflated by prior year market capitalization. LnSize and LnBM are the natural logarithm of total 
market capitalization and book to market ratio, respectively. Max(0, Quarterly Return) / Max(0, -Quarterly Return) is the 
absolute value of quarterly stock return if the current quarter return is positive / negative. 10% Price Limit / -10% Price Limit 
counts how many trading days reach the 10% / -10% price limit in the current quarter. Abnormal Volume is the quarterly RMB 
trading volume relative to the average trading volume in the prior 4 quarters. We exclude observations if the distribution 
proposal announcement date and its corresponding ex-right date are belonging to the same quarter. The sample period is from 
2003 to 2017, the numbers reported in parentheses are t statistics with standard errors clustered by stock and year × quarter. 
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.  
 
ΔShareholder (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Split Dummy 0.043*** 0.043*** 0.043***    
 (5.13) (5.28) (6.25)    
Split Ratio    0.083*** 0.084*** 0.078*** 
    (7.27) (7.54) (7.48) 
ΔDividends  0.321* 0.290*  0.280* 0.259 
  (1.95) (1.80)  (1.70) (1.63) 
ΔEarnings  0.155** 0.181***  0.155*** 0.182*** 
  (2.71) (2.84)  (2.74) (2.85) 
LnSize   0.024***   0.024*** 
   (3.88)   (3.79) 
LnBM   0.007   0.007 
   (1.24)   (1.23) 
Max(0, Quarterly Return)   -0.262***   -0.266*** 
   (-5.68)   (-5.74) 
Max(0, - Quarterly Return)   0.411***   0.416*** 
   (4.67)   (4.70) 
10% Price Limit   0.025***   0.025*** 
   (5.09)   (5.07) 
-10% Price Limit   0.014   0.014 
   (1.64)   (1.58) 
Abnormal Volume   0.068***   0.067*** 
   (9.47)   (9.43) 
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year × Quarter Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.052 0.053 0.171 0.055 0.057 0.174 
Observations 18518 18315 17511 18518 18315 17511 
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Table 8. Stock Splits and Retail Investor Sentiment 
This table reports the impact of stock splits on retrial investor sentiment. The dependent variables Retail Investor Sentiment 
[0, 1 ] and Retail Investor Sentiment [0, 10 ] are measured as the number of positive posts minus the number of negative posts 
deflated by the sum of positive and negative posts within the [-1, 1] or [-10, 1] window around firms’ distribution proposal 
announcement. The data of Investor discussion forum are retrieved from CNRDS dataset. CNRDS classifies each investor 
discussion post as into positive, negative and neutral posts by machine learning algorithm. Split Dummy equals one for firms 
conducting stock splits and zero otherwise. Split Ratio is the ratio of newly issued shares from stock splits as a fraction of the 
original number of shares outstanding. ΔDividends is the cash dividends change relative to the prior year deflated by prior year 
market capitalization. ΔEarnings is the seasonal earnings change deflated by prior year market capitalization. Annual Report 
is a dummy variable that equals one if the profit distribution proposal is disclosed together with the annual report and zero 
otherwise. LnSize and LnBM are the natural logarithm of total market capitalization and book to market ratio, respectively. 
Daily Return[-10, -1] is pre-event 10 days cumulative stock returns. Ret[-12, -2] is the compounded 11 monthly returns over 
[-12, -2]. The sample period is from 2009 to 2017, the numbers reported in parentheses are t statistics with standard errors 
clustered by stock and event date. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
 
Panel A (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  Retail Investor Sentiment [0, 1] Retail Investor Sentiment [0, 10] 
Split Dummy 0.064*** 0.067*** 0.062*** 0.049*** 0.049*** 0.047*** 
 (7.89) (7.33) (6.60) (10.35) (9.57) (8.98) 
ΔDividends  0.577 0.647*  0.066 0.068 
  (1.58) (1.78)  (0.31) (0.33) 
ΔEarnings  0.483*** 0.513***  0.208*** 0.234*** 
  (4.64) (4.88)  (3.35) (3.70) 
Annual Report  0.030 0.016  -0.001 -0.006 
  (1.28) (0.69)  (-0.08) (-0.45) 
LnSize   0.013   -0.008 
   (1.61)   (-1.34) 
LnBM   0.009   0.001 
   (0.89)   (0.22) 
Daily Return[-10, -1]   0.169***   0.070*** 
   (3.75)   (2.59) 
Ret[-12, -2]   0.012   0.009* 
   (1.43)   (1.75) 
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Event Date Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.220 0.221 0.226 0.499 0.500 0.505 
Observations 17237 15915 15367 17323 15996 15445 
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Panel B (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  Retail Investor Sentiment [0, 1] Retail Investor Sentiment [0, 10] 
Split Ratio 0.074*** 0.077*** 0.068*** 0.056*** 0.057*** 0.053*** 
 (7.44) (6.79) (5.78) (9.33) (8.32) (7.57) 
ΔDividends  0.571 0.648*  0.064 0.070 
  (1.56) (1.77)  (0.30) (0.34) 
ΔEarnings  0.485*** 0.514***  0.209*** 0.235*** 
  (4.66) (4.90)  (3.36) (3.70) 
Annual Report  0.039* 0.023  0.006 -0.000 
  (1.66) (0.93)  (0.43) (-0.02) 
LnSize   0.012   -0.008 
   (1.55)   (-1.40) 
LnBM   0.008   0.001 
   (0.82)   (0.12) 
Daily Return[-10, -1]   0.165***   0.067** 
   (3.67)   (2.46) 
Ret[-12, -2]   0.012   0.010* 
   (1.51)   (1.83) 
Firm Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Event Date Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.219 0.220 0.225 0.498 0.499 0.504 
Observations 17237 15915 15367 17323 15996 15445 
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Table 9. Stock Splits and Analyst Forecast Revisions 
This table reports the association between stock splits and analyst forecast for future performance. The dependent variable 
Forecast Revision is the revision of analyst consensus forecast of the earnings before and after the profit distribution 
announcement. Split Dummy equals one for firms conducting stock splits and zero otherwise. Split Ratio is the ratio of newly 
issued shares from stock splits as a fraction of the original number of shares outstanding. ΔDividends is the cash dividends 
change relative to the prior year deflated by prior year market capitalization. ΔEarnings is the seasonal earnings change deflated 
by prior year market capitalization. LnSize and LnBM are the natural logarithm of total market capitalization and book to 
market ratio, respectively. Ret[-12, -2] is the compounded 11 monthly returns over [-12, -2]. LnCoverage is natural logarithm 
of the number of analysts who issue analyst reports for the firm. Earnings Volatility is the standard deviation of past three 
years’ earnings scaled by prior year market capitalization. The sample period is from 2004 to 2017, the numbers reported in 
parentheses are t statistics with standard errors clustered by stock and event date. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance 
at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
 
Forecast Revision (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Split Dummy 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.002***    
 (4.38) (3.72) (3.14)    
Split Ratio    0.004*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 
    (4.07) (3.27) (3.27) 
ΔDividends  0.211*** 0.197***  0.210*** 0.196*** 
  (5.46) (5.13)  (5.44) (5.11) 
ΔEarnings  0.219*** 0.198***  0.219*** 0.199*** 
  (7.60) (6.82)  (7.62) (6.84) 
LnSize   -0.006***   -0.006*** 
   (-7.32)   (-7.33) 
LnBM   -0.008***   -0.008*** 
   (-6.25)   (-6.28) 
Ret[-12, -2]   0.007***   0.007*** 
   (8.49)   (8.49) 
LnCoverage   -0.001**   -0.001** 
   (-2.44)   (-2.46) 
Earnings Volatility   -0.032   -0.033 
   (-0.88)   (-0.89) 
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.042 0.082 0.120 0.042 0.082 0.119 
N 12346 12104 11542 12346 12104 11542 
 
  
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3541201
 53 
Table 10. Long-term Stock Performance When Splitting Firms Fall Short of Expectations 
This table reports long-term stock performance of splitting and non-splitting firms when they fall short of investors’ 
expectations. The dependent variables BHAR[1, 12] and BHAR[0, 12] are buy and hold abnormal returns relative to 25 size 
and book to market ratio independently sorted portfolio during the holding periods in the bracket, month 0 is the month when 
a firm announces its annual distribution proposal. Split Dummy equals one for firms conducting stock splits and zero otherwise. 
Split Ratio is the ratio of newly issued shares from stock splits as a fraction of the original number of shares outstanding. In 
each year for each analyst covered stock, we compute the difference between the next-year-realized net income and analysts’ 
median forecast. We sort the difference into 4 quartiles and define a dummy variable Underperform, which equals 1 if a firm 
belongs to the lowest quartile. ΔDividends is the cash dividends change relative to the prior year deflated by prior year market 
capitalization. ΔEarnings is the seasonal earnings change deflated by prior year market capitalization. LnSize and LnBM are 
the natural logarithm of total market capitalization and book to market ratio, respectively. Ret[-12, -2] is the compounded 11 
monthly returns over [-12, -2]. The Sample period is from 2004 to 2017, the numbers reported in parentheses are t statistics 
with standard errors clusted by stock and year. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
 
Panel A (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
BHAR [1, 12] [1, 12] [1, 12] [0, 12] [0, 12] [0, 12] 
[1] Split Dummy -0.002 -0.003 0.012 0.046** 0.045** 0.063*** 
 (-0.09) (-0.19) (0.69) (2.62) (2.61) (3.12) 
Under Perform -0.124*** -0.124*** -0.121*** -0.131*** -0.132*** -0.130*** 
 (-8.97) (-9.16) (-7.36) (-8.98) (-9.16) (-7.21) 
[2] Split Dummy × Underperform -0.116*** -0.114*** -0.117*** -0.125*** -0.125*** -0.124*** 
 (-3.70) (-3.68) (-3.94) (-3.52) (-3.51) (-3.70) 
ΔDividends  0.034 0.749  0.377 1.221** 
  (0.07) (1.49)  (0.74) (2.33) 
ΔEarnings  -0.018 0.023  0.207 0.234 
  (-0.08) (0.11)  (1.06) (1.37) 
LnSize   -0.158***   -0.187*** 
   (-5.70)   (-5.19) 
LnBM   0.175***   0.201*** 
   (4.07)   (4.48) 
Ret[-12, -2]   -0.090***   -0.108*** 
   (-3.70)   (-3.68) 
[1] + [2] -0.118*** -0.118*** -0.104*** -0.079** -0.080** -0.060** 
F-Test (15.58) (15.97) (17.81) (6.27) (6.28) (4.89) 
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.015 0.019 0.076 0.019 0.022 0.091 
Observations 13426 13164 11497 13426 13164 11497 
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Panel B (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
BHAR [1, 12] [1, 12] [1, 12] [0, 12] [0, 12] [0, 12] 
Split Ratio -0.021 -0.028 -0.004 0.055 0.049 0.080* 
 (-0.71) (-0.95) (-0.13) (1.67) (1.54) (2.08) 
Under Perform -0.129*** -0.130*** -0.126*** -0.136*** -0.138*** -0.134*** 
 (-9.08) (-9.16) (-7.56) (-8.69) (-8.79) (-7.17) 
Split Ratio × Under Perform -0.128* -0.121* -0.138** -0.152** -0.147* -0.163** 
 (-2.16) (-2.07) (-2.23) (-2.20) (-2.15) (-2.29) 
ΔDividends  0.060 0.765  0.368 1.195** 
  (0.13) (1.55)  (0.73) (2.32) 
ΔEarnings  -0.009 0.032  0.216 0.241 
  (-0.04) (0.15)  (1.12) (1.44) 
LnSize   -0.159***   -0.188*** 
   (-5.73)   (-5.24) 
LnBM   0.175***   0.201*** 
   (4.05)   (4.44) 
Ret[-12, -2]   -0.089***   -0.108*** 
   (-3.66)   (-3.70) 
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.015 0.019 0.076 0.019 0.022 0.091 
Observations 13426 13164 11497 13426 13164 11497 
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Table 11. Investor Composition and Market Reactions to Stock Splits 
This table reports the results of short-run market reaction to stock splits conditional on investor composition. The dependent 
variables (CAR[-1, 1] and CAR[-10, 1]) are cumulative abnormal returns over [-1, 1] and [-10, 1]. Split Ratio is the ratio of 
newly issued shares from stock splits as a fraction of the original number of shares outstanding. Institutional Holdings is the 
proportion of shares held by institutional investors. ΔDividends is the cash dividends change relative to the prior year deflated 
by prior year market capitalization. ΔEarnings is the seasonal earnings change deflated by prior year market capitalization. 
Annual Report is a dummy variable that equals one if the profit distribution proposal is disclosed together with the annual 
report and zero otherwise. LnSize and LnBM are the natural logarithm of total market capitalization and book to market ratio, 
respectively. CAR[-10, -2] is cumulative abnormal returns over [-10, -2]. Ret[-12, -2] is the compounded 11 monthly returns 
over [-12, -2]. The sample period is from 2001 to 2017, standard errors are clustered by stock and event date. ***, ** and * 
indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
CAR [-1, -1] [-10, 1] [-1, -1] [-10, 1] [-1, 1] [-10, 1] 
Split Ratio 0.050*** 0.081*** 0.048*** 0.082*** 0.052*** 0.084*** 
 (20.38) (21.54) (16.93) (18.93) (17.94) (20.05) 
Split Ratio × Institutional Holdings -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 (-8.70) (-5.91) (-7.42) (-5.23) (-7.67) (-5.59) 
Institutional Holdings 0.000*** -0.000 0.000** -0.000* 0.000*** 0.000 
 (2.67) (-1.21) (2.50) (-1.83) (3.67) (0.67) 
ΔDividends   0.061 0.236*** 0.093** 0.277*** 
   (1.64) (3.85) (2.51) (4.72) 
ΔEarnings   0.024** 0.149*** 0.040*** 0.154*** 
   (2.13) (7.30) (3.51) (7.01) 
Annual Report   -0.009** 0.009 -0.010*** 0.006 
   (-2.57) (1.37) (-2.71) (0.93) 
LnSize     -0.004*** -0.011*** 
     (-5.44) (-7.86) 
LnBM     0.000 0.002 
     (0.07) (1.19) 
CAR[-10, -2]     -0.071***  
     (-9.38)  
Ret[-12, -2]     -0.002** 0.001 
     (-2.11) (0.71) 
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Event Date Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.102 0.082 0.096 0.084 0.105 0.091 
Observations 25601 25601 23709 23709 22989 22989 
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Table 12. Pre-split Share Prices and Market Reactions to Stock Splits 
This table reports the results of the short-run market reaction to stock splits conditional on the pre-split stock price. The 
dependent variable (CAR[-1, 1] and CAR[-10, 1]) are cumulative abnormal returns over [-1, 1] and [-10, 1]. Split Ratio is the 
ratio of newly issued shares from stock splits as a fraction of the original number of shares outstanding. LnPrice is the natural 
logarithm of the stock’s previous month closing price. ΔDividends is the cash dividends change relative to the prior year 
deflated by prior year market capitalization. ΔEarnings is the seasonal earnings change deflated by prior year market 
capitalization. Annual Report is a dummy variable that equals one if the profit distribution proposal is disclosed together with 
the annual report and zero otherwise. LnSize and LnBM are the natural logarithm of total market capitalization and book to 
market ratio, respectively. CAR[-10, -2] is cumulative abnormal returns over [-10, -2]. Ret[-12, -2] is the compounded 11 
monthly returns over [-12, -2]. The sample period is from 1998 to 2017, standard errors are clustered by stock and event date. 
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.  
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
CAR [-1, 1] [-10, -1] [-1, 1] [-10, -1] [-1, 1] [-10, -1] 
Split Ratio 0.130*** 0.208*** 0.131*** 0.208*** 0.140*** 0.211*** 
 (15.06) (17.70) (13.38) (14.96) (14.45) (15.09) 
Split Ratio × LnPrice -0.028*** -0.041*** -0.029*** -0.042*** -0.031*** -0.043*** 
 (-10.16) (-11.06) (-9.29) (-9.38) (-10.02) (-9.55) 
LnPrice -0.010*** -0.018*** -0.010*** -0.020*** -0.012*** -0.020*** 
 (-9.81) (-9.99) (-8.81) (-10.38) (-9.35) (-9.07) 
ΔDividends   0.096*** 0.297*** 0.104*** 0.295*** 
   (2.88) (5.47) (3.13) (5.48) 
ΔEarnings   0.038*** 0.168*** 0.054*** 0.173*** 
   (3.57) (8.49) (4.77) (8.00) 
Annual Report   -0.005* 0.005 -0.005* 0.004 
   (-1.76) (0.91) (-1.78) (0.70) 
LnSize     -0.001 -0.006*** 
     (-1.11) (-4.53) 
LnBM     -0.004*** -0.005*** 
     (-4.63) (-2.85) 
CAR[-10, -2]     -0.077***  
     (-10.10)  
Ret[-12, -2]     -0.001 0.002 
     (-0.67) (1.41) 
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Event Date Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.105 0.097 0.100 0.099 0.111 0.101 
Observations 28109 28109 25750 25750 25130 25130 
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Table 13. Control for Other Potential Channels 
This table reports regression analyses of short-run market reaction to stock splits with different share splitting ratio. The 
dependent variable (CAR[-1, 1] and CAR[-10, 1]) are cumulative abnormal returns over [-1, 1] and [-10, 1]. Split Ratio is the 
ratio of newly issued shares from stock splits as a fraction of the original number of shares outstanding. Split from Retained 
Earnings and Split from Capital Surplus are the ratio of newly issued shares funded by retained earnings and capital surplus 
as a fraction of the original number of shares outstanding, respectively. ΔDividends is the cash dividends change relative to the 
prior year deflated by prior year market capitalization. ΔEarnings is the seasonal earnings change deflated by prior year market 
capitalization. Annual Report is a dummy variable that equals one if the profit distribution proposal is disclosed together with 
the annual report and zero otherwise. LnSize and LnBM are the natural logarithm of total market capitalization and book to 
market ratio, respectively. CAR[-10, -2] is cumulative abnormal returns over [-10, -2]. Ret[-12, -2] is the compounded 11 
monthly returns over [-12, -2]. ΔIlliquidity is the difference of averaged post-ex-day [10, 70] and pre-announcement [-70, -10] 
Amihud(2002) illiquidity measure. ΔTurnover is the difference of averaged post-ex-day [10, 70] and pre-announcement [-70, 
-10] daily turnover ratio. ΔVolatility is the difference of averaged post-ex-day [10, 70] and pre-announcement [-70, -10] return 
volatility. ΔCoverage is the change of analyst coverage before and after stock splits. ΔShareholder is the change of shareholder 
number before stock splits announcement and after stock splits implementation. The sample period in column (1) and (2) is 
from 2009 to 2017, in column (3)~(5) is from 2003 to 2017, the numbers reported in parentheses are t-statistics with standard 
errors clustered by stock and event date. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
CAR [-1, 1] [-1, 1] [-1, 1] [-1, 1] [-1, 1] [-1, 1] 
Split Ratio  0.040*** 0.041*** 0.037*** 0.037***  
  (18.74) (19.11) (15.96) (15.67)  
Split from Retained Earnings 0.049***     0.045*** 
 (9.63)     (7.53) 
Split from Capital Surplus 0.040***     0.036*** 
 (17.14)     (14.16) 
ΔDividends 0.100*** 0.104*** 0.101*** 0.088** 0.085** 0.085** 
 (2.98) (3.12) (3.03) (2.24) (2.15) (2.16) 
ΔEarnings 0.054*** 0.052*** 0.053*** 0.036*** 0.033*** 0.033*** 
 (4.64) (4.50) (4.62) (3.00) (2.79) (2.79) 
Annual Report -0.006** -0.006** -0.006** -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.012*** 
 (-2.03) (-2.03) (-1.98) (-2.90) (-2.87) (-2.94) 
LnSize -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** 
 (-5.16) (-4.76) (-4.93) (-5.67) (-5.03) (-5.09) 
LnBM 0.001 0.000 0.001 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.84) (0.44) (0.72) (-0.26) (-0.38) (-0.34) 
CAR[-10, -2] -0.074*** -0.076*** -0.074*** -0.071*** -0.074*** -0.074*** 
 (-9.60) (-9.88) (-9.65) (-8.94) (-9.22) (-9.23) 
Ret[-12, -2] -0.003*** -0.002** -0.002** -0.003** -0.003** -0.003** 
 (-2.68) (-1.98) (-2.20) (-2.31) (-2.10) (-2.11) 
ΔIlliquidity  -0.888***   -1.011*** -1.010*** 
  (-4.91)   (-4.38) (-4.38) 
ΔTurnover  0.137***   0.132*** 0.132*** 
  (4.90)   (3.76) (3.75) 
ΔVolatility   0.101**  -0.019 -0.019 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3541201
 58 
   (2.20)  (-0.31) (-0.32) 
ΔCoverage     1.023*** 1.026*** 
     (3.21) (3.22) 
ΔShareholder    0.005*** 0.458*** 0.454*** 
    (4.08) (3.48) (3.45) 
Firm Fixed Effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Event Date Fixed Effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.098 0.102 0.099 0.104 0.107 0.107 
Observations 25193 25189 25188 20133 20132 20132 
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Figure D1. The Empirical Distribution of BHAR 
This figure plots the empirical distribution of the mean buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHAR) for stock splits. For each splitting stock, we randomly select a non-splitting stock in the same year-
month and the same benchmark portfolio, and form a pseudo portfolio using only the non-splitting stocks and calculate the BHAR for the pseudo portfolio. We repeat the above procedure for 1,000 
times and obtain the empirical distribution of the BHARs under the null assumption of zero abnormal returns. Each event stock and its associated pseudo stock enter into the portfolio s months after 
the split announcement month and held for τ months. The holding periods are [1, 36], [1, 12], [12, 24] and [25, 36], respectively. We use value-weighted market portfolio as benchmark in Panel A, 
value-weighted industry portfolio as benchmark in Panel B, and value-weighted 25 size and book-to-market ratio independently sorted portfolio as benchmark in Panel C, and report the corresponding 
empirical distributions. The dashed line demonstrate the realized BHAR for share splitting stocks.  
 
Panel A. BHAR with Market Portfolio as the Benchmark 
 
BHAR[1, 36]                           BHAR[1, 12]                            BHAR[13, 24]                          BHAR[25, 36] 
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Panel B. BHAR with Industry Portfolios as the Benchmark 
 
BHAR[1, 36]                           BHAR[1, 12]                            BHAR[13, 24]                          BHAR[25, 36] 
 
Panel C. BHAR with 25 Size and B/M Sorted Portfolios as the Benchmark  
 
BHAR[1, 36]                           BHAR[1, 12]                            BHAR[13, 24] 
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Table D1. Short-term Market Reaction to Stock Splits with Different Split Ratio: Alternative Model Specification
This table reports regression analyses of short-run market reaction to stock splits with different share splitting ratio employing 
alternative model specifications. The dependent variables (CAR[-1, 1] and CAR[-10, 1]) are cumulative abnormal returns over 
[-1, 1] and [-10, 1]. Split Ratio is the ratio of newly issued shares from stock splits as a fraction of the original number of shares 
outstanding. ΔDividends is the cash dividends change relative to the prior year deflated by prior year market capitalization. 
ΔEarnings is the seasonal earnings change deflated by prior year market capitalization. Annual Report is a dummy variable 
that equals one if the profit distribution proposal is disclosed together with the annual report and zero otherwise. LnSize and 
LnBM are the natural logarithm of total market capitalization and the book-to-market ratio, respectively. CAR[-10, -2] is 
cumulative abnormal returns over [-10, -2]. Ret[-12, -2] is the compounded 11 monthly returns over [-12, -2]. In Column (1) 
and (2) we employ OLS regression with firm and event date fixed effects, with firm and event date clustered standard error on 
a PSM matched sample. In each year, we find a non-splitting firm that has similar observable characteristics to the splitting 
firm. These characteristics include LnSize, LnBM, LnPrice (the natural logarithm of closing price), ΔEarnings, ΔDividends, 
Split Capacity (capital surplus plus retained earnings per share, which determines the maximal split ratio), ROA (return on 
asset), Age (number of years a firm has been listed) and industry affiliations (22 industries based on the China Securities 
Regulatory Commission industry classification). In Column (3) and (4) we employ the Fama & Macbeth (1973) regression by 
running cross-sectional regressions with industry fixed effects year by year and report the time-series average of regression 
coefficients and the corresponding sample t statistics. In Column (5) and (6) we employ OLS regression with year and industry 
fixed effects, with robust standard errors but only use the splitting firms. The sample period is from 1998 to 2017, the numbers 
reported in parentheses are t statistic. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 PSM Sample Fama-Macbeth  Splitting Firm 
CAR [-1, 1] [-10, 1] [-1, 1] [-10, 1] [-1, 1] [-10, 1] 
Split Ratio 0.044*** 0.077*** 0.052*** 0.105*** 0.046*** 0.088*** 
 (15.64) (19.02) (13.51) (11.28) (12.98) (18.37) 
ΔDividends 0.137* 0.323*** 0.158*** 0.371*** 0.127 0.328** 
 (1.84) (2.67) (4.08) (5.22) (1.37) (2.45) 
ΔEarnings 0.107** 0.223*** 0.141*** 0.316*** 0.107* 0.298*** 
 (2.55) (3.24) (3.32) (4.78) (1.85) (3.27) 
Annual Report -0.007 0.006 -0.011** -0.008 -0.010*** -0.001 
 (-1.51) (0.68) (-2.62) (-1.23) (-3.37) (-0.22) 
LnSize -0.006*** -0.013*** -0.000 -0.002 -0.005*** -0.008*** 
 (-3.38) (-4.34) (-0.23) (-1.22) (-4.67) (-4.76) 
LnBM -0.001 0.003 -0.001 -0.000 0.002 0.001 
 (-0.43) (0.62) (-1.08) (-0.34) (0.76) (0.28) 
CAR[-10, -2] -0.087***  -0.090***  -0.137***  
 (-6.14)  (-8.31)  (-8.89)  
Ret[-12, -2] -0.002 0.002 -0.002** -0.002 -0.005** -0.008*** 
 (-0.81) (0.46) (-2.27) (-0.56) (-2.48) (-2.67) 
Firm Effect     Yes Yes 
Industry Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes   
Event Date Effect     Yes Yes 
Year Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes   
R2 0.169 0.150 0.106 0.140 0.124 0.146 
Observations 7382 7382 25635 25635 4129 4129 
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Table D2. Long-run Stock Performance Following Stock Splits 
Panel A. Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Return (BHAR) Approach 
This table reports the long-run performance of splitting stocks using the buy-and-hold abnormal return (BHAR) approach. We 
calculate the BHAR as the buy-and-hold cumulative returns of splitting stock minus that of a benchmark portfolio. To obtain 
the empirical distribution of BHAR, we randomly select a non-splitting stock in the same year-month and in the same 
benchmark portfolio as the splitting stock, and form a pseudo portfolio using the non-splitting stocks and calculate the BHAR 
for the pseudo portfolio. We repeat the above procedure for 1,000 times and obtain the empirical distribution of the BHAR 
under the null assumption of zero abnormal return. Each event stock and its corresponding pseudo stock are bought s months 
after the split announcement month and held for τ months. The holding periods are [1, 36], [1, 12], [12, 24] and [25, 36], 
respectively. yh and yl are the 95th and the 5th percentile value derived from the empirical distribution, p is the fraction of 
BHARs in the empirical distribution that are larger in magnitude than the BHAR of the splitting sample. The three columns 
MKT, IND, and CHA represent different benchmark portfolios, corresponding to the value-weighted market portfolio, value-
weighted industry portfolio, and value-weighted size and book-to-market ratio independently double-sorted portfolio, 
respectively. 
 
Holding Period [s, s+τ] Statistics MKT IND CHA 
[1, 36] 
BHAR 34.30% 24.87% 12.11% 
yh 26.04% 19.38% 8.22% 
yl 20.53% 14.02% 2.44% 
p 0 0 0 
[1,12] 
BHAR 7.64% 5.81% 3.52% 
yh 6.27% 4.81% 2.40% 
yl 4.32% 2.90% 0.26% 
p 0 0 0 
[13, 24] 
BHAR 5.95% 3.46% 1.62% 
yh 6.63% 4.78% 2.84% 
yl 4.40% 2.52% 0.61% 
p 0.24 0.62 0.57 
[25, 36] 
BHAR 5.54% 2.80% 2.05% 
yh 5.17% 3.16% 2.27% 
yl 2.71% 0.76% -0.30% 
p 0.01 0.12 0.08 
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Panel B. Calendar-Time Portfolio Approach  
This table reports the long-run performance of splitting stocks using the calendar-time portfolio approach. In each month, we 
select all the stocks announcing split in the previous [1, 36] months, [1, 12] months, [13, 24] months or [25, 36] months 
according to the holding period in brackets. Column (1) report the time-series average excess return. Columns (2) to (6) report 
portfolio alphas estimated from time-series regression of excess returns on the market factor, the Fama and French (1993) 3 
factors, the Carhart (1997) 4 factors, the Fama and French (2015) 5 factors and the Liu, Stambaugh and Yuan (2018) Chinese 
3 factors, respectively. The upper part of Panel B reports the results for the equal-weighted portfolio and the bottom part reports 
the results for the value-weighted portfolio. The numbers reported in parentheses are t statistics, ***, ** and * indicate 
statistical significance at 1%, 5% and, 10%, respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Holding Period [s, s+τ] ER CAPM FF-3 Carhart-4 FF-5 CH-3 
Equal Weighted Stock Split Portfolio 
[1, 36] 0.015** 0.006** 0.002* 0.001 0.001 0.004*** 
 (2.31) (2.44) (1.71) (1.44) (0.53) (3.39) 
[1, 12] 0.015** 0.006** 0.003** 0.003* 0.001 0.004** 
 (2.36) (2.44) (2.07) (1.74) (0.73) (2.03) 
[13, 24] 0.014** 0.005** 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.004*** 
 (2.25) (2.25) (1.31) (0.94) (0.25) (2.92) 
[25, 36] 0.015** 0.006** 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.004*** 
 (2.30) (2.44) (1.60) (1.50) (1.19) (4.06) 
Value Weighted Stock Split Portfolio 
[1, 36] 0.010* 0.002 0.002*** 0.001 0.001* 0.002** 
 (1.75) (1.63) (2.84) (1.44) (1.89) (2.03) 
[1, 12] 0.011* 0.002* 0.004*** 0.003* 0.003** 0.002 
 (1.85) (1.66) (3.37) (1.74) (2.21) (1.41) 
[13, 24] 0.008 0.000 0.001 0.001 -0.000 0.002 
 (1.52) (0.28) (0.83) (0.94) (-0.11) (1.16) 
[25, 36] 0.010* 0.001 0.003** 0.002 0.002** 0.003* 
  (1.71) (1.12) (2.35) (1.50) (2.12) (1.67) 
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